Sticky Military and Veterans thread

[whitefish]

The U.S. role grows

By the middle of 1960 it was apparent that the South Vietnamese army and security forces could not cope with the new threat. During the last half of 1959, VC-initiated ambushes and attacks on posts averaged well over 100 a month. In the next year 2,500 government functionaries and other real and imagined enemies of the Viet Cong were assassinated. It took some time for the new situation to be recognized in Saigon and Washington. Only after four VC companies had attacked and overrun an ARVN regimental headquarters northeast of Saigon in January 1960 did Americans in Vietnam begin to plan for increased U.S. aid to Diem. They also began to search for ways to persuade Diem to reform and reorganize his government—a search that would prove futile.


Track the rapid escalation of the Vietnam War under Pres. John F. Kennedy's administrationUnder U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy, the number of U.S. advisers to the South Vietnamese military rose from 1,500 to 15,000. From Vietnam

To the new administration of U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy, who took office in 1961, Vietnam represented both a challenge and an opportunity. The Viet Cong's armed struggle against Diem seemed to be a prime example of the new Chinese and Soviet strategy of encouraging and aiding "wars of national liberation" in newly independent nations of Asia and Africa—in other words, helping communist-led insurgencies to subvert and overthrow the shaky new governments of emerging nations. Kennedy and some of his close advisers believed that Vietnam presented an opportunity to test the United States' ability to conduct a "counterinsurgency" against communist subversion and guerrilla warfare. Kennedy accepted without serious question the so-called domino theory, which held that the fates of all Southeast Asian countries were closely linked and that a communist success in one must necessarily lead to the fatal weakening of the others. A successful effort in Vietnam—in Kennedy's words, "the cornerstone of the free world in Southeast Asia"—would provide to both allies and adversaries evidence of U.S. determination to meet the challenge of communist expansion in the Third World.


Kennedy, John F.: presidential address on the Pathet LaoU.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy addressing the press about communist military action in Laos, March 23, 1961

Though never doubting Vietnam's importance, the new president was obliged, during much of his first year in office, to deal with far more pressing issues—the construction of the Berlin Wall, conflicts between the Laotian government and the communist-led Pathet Lao, and the humiliating failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Because of these other, more widely known crises, it seemed to some of Kennedy's advisers all the more important to score some sort of success in Vietnam. Success seemed urgently needed as membership in the NLF continued to climb, military setbacks to the ARVN continued, and the rate of infiltration from the North increased.

U.S. intelligence estimated that in 1960 about 4,000 communist cadres infiltrated from the North; by 1962 the total had risen to some 12,900. Most of these men were natives of South Vietnam who had been regrouped to the North after Geneva. More than half were Communist Party members. Hardened and experienced leaders, they provided a framework around which the PLAF could be organized. To arm and equip their growing forces in the South, Hanoi leaders sent crew-served weapons and ammunition in steel-hulled motor junks down the coast of Vietnam and also through Laos via a network of tracks known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Most of the firearms for PLAF soldiers actually came from the United States: large quantities of American rifles, carbines, machine guns, and mortars were captured from Saigon's armed forces or simply sold to the Viet Cong by Diem's corrupt officers and functionaries.

Many of the South's problems could be attributed to the continuing incompetence, rigidity, and corruption of the Diem regime, but the South Vietnamese president had few American critics in Saigon or Washington. Instead, the U.S. administration made great efforts to reassure Diem of its support, dispatching Vice Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson to Saigon in May 1961 and boosting economic and military aid.


Montagnards in the Vietnam WarU.S. adviser training Montagnards (indigenous central highlanders) at a fortified camp near Buon Me Thuot in central Vietnam, July 1962.

As the situation continued to deteriorate, Kennedy sent two key advisers, economist Walt W. Rostow and former army chief of staff Maxwell Taylor, to Vietnam in the fall of 1961 to assess conditions. The two concluded that the South Vietnamese government was losing the war with the Viet Cong and had neither the will nor the ability to turn the tide on its own. They recommended a greatly expanded program of military assistance, including such items as helicopters and armoured personnel carriers, and an ambitious plan to place American advisers and technical experts at all levels and in all agencies of the Vietnamese government and military. They also recommended the introduction of a limited number of U.S. combat troops, a measure the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been urging as well.

Well aware of the domestic political consequences of "losing" another country to the communists, Kennedy could see no viable exit from Vietnam, but he also was reluctant to commit combat troops to a war in Southeast Asia. Instead, the administration proceeded with vigour and enthusiasm to carry out the expansive program of aid and guidance proposed in the Rostow-Taylor report. A new four-star general's position—commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV)—was established in Saigon to guide the military assistance effort. The number of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam, less than 800 throughout the 1950s, rose to about 9,000 by the middle of 1962.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The conflict deepens

Buoyed by its new American weapons and encouraged by its aggressive and confident American advisers, the South Vietnamese army took the offensive against the Viet Cong. At the same time, the Diem government undertook an extensive security campaign called the Strategic Hamlet Program. The object of the program was to concentrate rural populations into more defensible positions where they could be more easily protected and segregated from the Viet Cong. The hamlet project was inspired by a similar program in Malaya, where local farmers had been moved into so-called New Villages during a rebellion by Chinese Malayan communists in 1948–60. In the case of Vietnam, however, it proved virtually impossible to tell which Vietnamese were to be protected and which excluded. Because of popular discontent with the compulsory labour and frequent dislocations involved in establishing the villages, many strategic hamlets soon had as many VC recruits inside their walls as outside.


Examine the state of the U.S.-backed and Diem-led South Vietnamese army against the communist Viet CongThe Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), though well-equipped and trained by U.S. advisers, was poorly motivated and poorly led in its fight against the Viet Cong.

Meanwhile, the Viet Cong learned to cope with the ARVN's new array of American weapons. Helicopters proved vulnerable to small-arms fire, while armoured personnel carriers could be stopped or disoriented if their exposed drivers or machine gunners were hit. The communists' survival of many military encounters was helped by the fact that the leadership of the South Vietnamese army was as incompetent, faction-ridden, and poorly trained as it had been in the 1950s. In January 1963 a Viet Cong battalion near the village of Ap Bac in the Mekong delta, south of Saigon, though surrounded and outnumbered by ARVN forces, successfully fought its way out of its encirclement, destroying five helicopters and killing about 80 South Vietnamese soldiers and three American advisers. By now some aggressive American newsmen were beginning to report on serious deficiencies in the U.S. advisory and support programs in Vietnam (see Sidebar: The Vietnam War and the Media), and some advisers at lower levels were beginning to agree with them, but there was also a large and powerful bureaucracy in Saigon that had a deep stake in ensuring that U.S. programs appeared successful. The USMACV commander Paul Harkins and U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting in particular continued to assure Washington that all was going well.


Self-immolation of Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc in protest during the Vietnam WarBuddhist monk Thich Quang Duc, doused in gasoline, burning himself to death to protest the policies of Vietnamese Pres. Ngo Dinh Diem, Saigon, Vietnam, June 11, 1963.

By the summer of 1963, however, there were growing doubts about the ability of the Diem government to prosecute the war. The behaviour of the Ngo family, always odd, had now become bizarre. Diem's brother Nhu was known to smoke opium daily and was suspected by U.S. intelligence of secretly negotiating with the North. Nhu's wife, known to the world as Madame Nhu, wielded enormous influence, which she used to promote Roman Catholic social causes and ridicule the country's Buddhist majority. In May 1963 the Ngos became embroiled in a fatal quarrel with the Buddhist leadership. Strikes and demonstrations by Buddhists in Saigon and Hue were met with violence by the army and Nhu's security forces and resulted in numerous arrests. The following month a Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Duc, publicly doused himself with gasoline and set himself ablaze as a protest against Diem's repression. Sensational photographs of that event were on the front pages of major American newspapers the following morning.

Learn about the U.S. government's prior knowledge of the military coup against and assassination of Ngo Dinh DiemOn November 1, 1963, South Vietnamese Pres. Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and killed in a coup mounted by his own military with the prior knowledge of the U.S. government.

By now many students and members of the professional classes in South Vietnamese cities had joined the Buddhists. After a series of brutal raids by government forces on Buddhist pagodas in August, a group of South Vietnamese generals secretly approached the U.S. government to determine how Washington might react to a coup to remove Diem. The U.S. reply was far from discouraging, but it was not until November, after further deterioration in Diem's relations with Washington, that the generals felt ready to move. On November 1, ARVN units seized control of Saigon, disarmed Nhu's security forces, and occupied the presidential palace. The American attitude was officially neutral, but the U.S. embassy maintained contact with the dissident generals while making no move to aid the Ngos, who were captured and murdered by the army.


William Westmoreland; Lyndon B. JohnsonWilliam Westmoreland meeting with U.S. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson in the White House, Washington, D.C., 1968.

Diem's death was followed by Kennedy's less than three weeks later. With respect to Vietnam, the assassinated president left his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, a legacy of indecision, half-measures, and gradually increasing involvement. Kennedy had relished Cold War challenges; Johnson did not. A veteran politician and one of the ablest men ever to serve in the U.S. Senate, he had an ambitious domestic legislative agenda that he was determined to fight through Congress. Foreign policy crises would be at best a distraction and at worst a threat to his domestic reforms. Yet Johnson, like Kennedy, was also well aware of the high political costs of "losing" another country to communism. He shared the view of most of his advisers, many of them holdovers from the Kennedy administration, that Vietnam was also a key test of U.S. credibility and ability to keep its commitments to its allies. Consequently, Johnson was determined to do everything necessary to carry on the American commitment to South Vietnam. He replaced Harkins with Gen. William Westmoreland, a former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and increased the number of U.S. military personnel still further—from 16,000 at the time of Kennedy's death in November 1963 to 23,000 by the end of 1964.

US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The Gulf of Tonkin

While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. Those who had expected that the removal of the unpopular Ngos would lead to unity and a more vigorous prosecution of the war were swiftly disillusioned. A short-lived military junta was followed by a shaky dictatorship under Gen. Nguyen Khanh in January 1964.

In Hanoi, communist leaders, believing that victory was near, decided to make a major military commitment to winning the South. Troops and then entire units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were sent south through Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which was by that time becoming a network of modern roads capable of handling truck traffic. Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong strongly supported the North Vietnamese offensive and promised to supply weapons and technical and logistical personnel. The Soviets, though now openly hostile to China, also decided to send aid to the North.

With the South Vietnamese government in disarray, striking a blow against the North seemed to the Americans to be the only option. U.S. advisers were already working with the South Vietnamese to carry out small maritime raids and parachute drops of agents, saboteurs, and commandos into North Vietnam. These achieved mixed success and in any case were too feeble to have any real impact. By the summer of 1964 the Pentagon had developed a plan for air strikes against selected targets in North Vietnam designed to inflict pain on the North and perhaps retard its support of the war in the South. To make clear the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, some of Johnson's advisers urged him to seek a congressional resolution granting him broad authority to take action to safeguard U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. Johnson, however, preferred to shelve the controversial issue of Vietnam until after the November election.


Analyze the effects of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed under the Lyndon Johnson administration during the Vietnam WarIn August 1964, in response to an alleged attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the U.S. Congress authorized Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson to take any action necessary to deal with threats against U.S. forces and allies in Southeast Asia.

An unexpected development in August 1964 altered that timetable. On August 2 the destroyer USS Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats while on electronic surveillance patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. The preceding day, patrol boats of the South Vietnamese navy had carried out clandestine raids on the islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu just off the coast of North Vietnam, and the North Vietnamese may have assumed that the Maddox was involved. In any case, the U.S. destroyer suffered no damage, and the North Vietnamese boats were driven off by gunfire from the Maddox and from aircraft based on a nearby carrier.

President Johnson reacted to news of the attack by announcing that the U.S. Navy would continue patrols in the gulf and by sending a second destroyer, the Turner Joy, to join the Maddox. On the night of August 4 the two ships reported a second attack by torpedo boats. Although the captain of the Maddox soon cautioned that evidence for the second incident was inconclusive, Johnson and his advisers chose to believe those who insisted that a second attack had indeed taken place. The president ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases, and he requested congressional support for a broad resolution authorizing him to take whatever action he deemed necessary to deal with future threats to U.S. forces or U.S. allies in Southeast Asia.

The measure, soon dubbed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed the Senate and House overwhelmingly on August 7. Few who voted for the resolution were aware of the doubts concerning the second attack, and even fewer knew of the connection between the North Vietnamese attacks and U.S.-sponsored raids in the North or that the Maddox was on an intelligence mission. Although what many came to see as Johnson's deceptions would cause problems later, the immediate result of the president's actions was to remove Vietnam as an issue from the election campaign. In November Johnson was reelected by a landslide.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The United States enters the war

Between the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the U.S. presidential election in November 1964, the situation in Vietnam had changed for the worse. Beginning in September, the Khanh government was succeeded by a bewildering array of cliques and coalitions, some of which stayed in power less than a month. In the countryside even the best ARVN units seemed incapable of defeating the main forces of the Viet Cong. The communists were now deliberately targeting U.S. military personnel and bases, beginning with a mortar attack on the U.S. air base at Bien Hoa near Saigon in November.


See how the Viet Cong's successful guerrilla warfare pushed Lyndon Johnson toward the path of total warBy the summer of 1964, the successes of the Viet Cong on the battlefield led the U.S. government to conclude that only massive military intervention could save South Vietnam.

Many of Johnson's advisers now began to argue for some sort of retaliation against the North. Air attacks against North Vietnam, they argued, would boost the morale of the shaky South Vietnamese and reassure them of continuing American commitment. They would also make Hanoi "pay a price" for its war against Saigon, and they might actually reduce the ability of the North to supply men and matériel for the military effort in the South. Except for Undersecretary of State George Ball, all the president's civilian aides and principal military advisers believed in the efficacy of a bombing campaign; they differed only as to how it should be conducted.

The military favoured a short and sharp campaign intended to cripple the North's war-making capabilities. On the other hand, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton argued for a series of graduated air attacks that would become progressively more damaging until the North Vietnamese decided that the cost of waging war in the South was too high. Within the administration, both Ball and Vice Pres. Hubert H. Humphrey warned the president that a major bombing campaign would likely lead only to further American commitment and political problems at home. But Johnson was more concerned with the immediate need to take action in order to halt the slide in Saigon. In mid-February, without public announcement, the United States began a campaign of sustained air strikes against the North that were code-named Rolling Thunder.


Witness U.S. marines land at Da Nang and North Vietnamese troops infiltrate South Vietnam from LaosIn March 1965 U.S. Marines landed at Da Nang, South Vietnam, and regular troops of the North Vietnamese Army continued to infiltrate into the South.

The bombing campaign followed the graduated path outlined by Bundy but was steadily expanded to include more targets and more frequent attacks. It was closely directed from the White House in order to avoid provoking the Chinese or Soviets through such actions as attacking ports where Soviet ships might be docked or hitting targets near the Chinese border. Yet it was soon apparent that the bombing would have little direct impact on the struggle in South Vietnam, where the communists appeared to be gaining ground inexorably. By mid-March Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were advising the White House that the United States would have to commit its own troops for combat if it wished to forestall a communist victory. Unhappy memories of the Korean War, where U.S. troops had been bogged down in costly indecisive fighting for three years, had made Johnson and his predecessors reluctant to send soldiers to fight in Asia, but the choice now confronting the president appeared to be between committing troops or enduring outright defeat.


U.S. Marines; Da Nang Air BaseU.S. Marines wading ashore near Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam, 1965.

By June 1965 Westmoreland was predicting the likely collapse of the South Vietnamese army, and he recommended the rapid dispatch of U.S. troops to undertake offensive missions against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese anywhere in South Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, on a mission to Vietnam in early July, confirmed the need for additional forces. In late July Johnson took the final steps that would commit the United States to full-scale war in Vietnam: he authorized the dispatch of 100,000 troops immediately and an additional 100,000 in 1966. The president publicly announced his decisions at a news conference at the end of July. There was no declaration of war—not even an address to Congress—and no attempt to put the country on a war footing economically. The National Guard and military reserves were not called to active service, even though such a measure had long been part of the military's mobilization plans.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Firepower comes to naught

Vietnam War, 1965A South Vietnamese farmer passing a U.S. Marine on patrol, 1965.

Although Johnson and his advisers had painstakingly examined the question of committing military forces to Vietnam—how many should be sent and when—they had given little thought to the question of what the troops might do once they arrived. In contrast to the tightly controlled air war in the North, conduct of the ground war in the South was largely left to the leadership of General Westmoreland. Westmoreland commanded all U.S. operations in the South, but he was reluctant to press for a unified U.S. and South Vietnamese command despite the questionable capabilities of many South Vietnamese generals. Instead, the two allies depended on "coordination" and a continuation of the existing advisory relationship, with every South Vietnamese army unit larger than a company having its complement of U.S. advisers. At the top of the hierarchy, Westmoreland himself served as senior adviser to the chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, Gen. Cao Van Vien. The chronic political instability in Saigon seemed finally to have abated with the installation in February 1965 of a government headed by the army general Nguyen Van Thieu as head of state and air force general Nguyen Cao Ky as prime minister. This arrangement, backed by most of the top military commanders, lasted until 1968, when Ky was eased out of power, leaving Thieu in sole control.


Johnson, Lyndon B.U.S. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson watching a helicopter flight exercise at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, July 23, 1966.

Whatever the status of the South Vietnamese forces, they were clearly relegated to a secondary role as U.S. troops and equipment poured into the country. To support these forces, the Americans constructed an enormous logistical infrastructure that included four new jet-capable air bases with 10,000-foot (3,000-metre) runways, six new deepwater ports, 75 tactical air bases, 26 hospitals, and more than 10,000,000 square feet (900,000 square metres) of warehousing. By the fall of 1965, U.S. Marines and soldiers had clashed with NVA and VC main-force troops in bloody battles on Cape Ba Lang An (also called the Batangan Peninsula), southeast of Da Nang, and in the Ia Drang valley in the central highlands. The U.S. forces employed their full panoply of firepower, including air strikes, artillery, armed helicopters, and even B-52 bombers, to inflict enormous losses on the enemy. Yet the communists believed they had more than held their own in these battles, and they were encouraged by the fact that they could easily reoccupy any areas they might have lost once the Americans pulled out.


U.S. marines; Vietnam WarU.S. marines wading through a marsh during the Vietnam War, November 1965.

Westmoreland's basic assumption was that U.S. forces, with their enormous and superior firepower, could best be employed in fighting the enemy's strongest units in the jungles and mountains, away from heavily populated areas. Behind this "shield" provided by the Americans, the South Vietnamese army and security forces could take on local Viet Cong elements and proceed with the job of reasserting government control in the countryside. Meanwhile, the regular forces of the Viet Cong and the NVA would continue to suffer enormous casualties at the hands of massive U.S. firepower. Eventually, went the argument, the communists would reach the point where they would no longer be able to replace their losses on the battlefield. Having been ground down on the battlefield, they would presumably agree to a favourable peace settlement.


Search-and-destroy patrol in the Vietnam War, Phuoc Tuy province, South VietnamU.S. soldiers on a search-and-destroy patrol in Phuoc Tuy province, South Vietnam, June 1966.

That point seemed very distant to most Americans as the war continued into 1966 and 1967. Washington declared that the war was being won, but American casualties continued to mount, and much of what the public could see of the war on television appeared confusing if not futile. Because Westmoreland's strategy was based on attrition, one of the ways to measure progress was to track the number of enemy killed. The resultant "body count," which was supposed to be carried out by troops during or immediately after combat, soon became notorious for inaccuracy and for the tendency of U.S. commanders to exaggerate the figures. A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN), a study commissioned by U.S. Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson and published in 1966, raised serious questions about Westmoreland's approach. It proposed that U.S. efforts should be concentrated on providing security and stability for the rural population in South Vietnam and suggested that attrition would not work as an effective counterinsurgency strategy. At the time of its publication, PROVN was largely dismissed by military commanders, and the continued emphasis on overwhelming firepower and "search-and-destroy" missions amounted to an almost wholesale rejection of its recommendations.


U.S. wartime use of defoliant in VietnamU.S. helicopter spraying defoliant in dense jungle during the Vietnam War, 1969.

In the provinces just north and east of Saigon, some large-scale operations such as Cedar Falls and Junction City, involving up to a thousand U.S. troops supported by hundreds of sorties by helicopters and fighter-bombers, were mounted to destroy communist base areas and supplies. Though yielding large quantities of captured weapons and supplies, they were ultimately indecisive, because the U.S. forces would invariably withdraw when they had completed their sweeps and in due course the Viet Cong and NVA would return. In order to deny the NVA and Viet Cong the use of dense forest to conceal their movements and to hide their supply lines and bases, the U.S. Air Force sprayed millions of gallons of a herbicide called Agent Orange along the Vietnamese border with Laos and Cambodia, in areas northwest of Saigon, and along major waterways. Agent Orange was effective in killing vegetation—but only at the price of causing considerable ecological damage to Vietnam and of exposing thousands of people to potentially toxic chemicals that would later cause serious and sometimes fatal health problems.

Along the DMZ separating North and South Vietnam, the Americans established a string of fortified bases extending from just north of Quang Tri on the South China Sea westward to the Laotian border. These bases were part of a system that also included electronic warning devices, minefields, and infrared detectors designed to check infiltration or outright invasion from the North. The North Vietnamese, pleased to find that the strong-point obstacle system was within range of their artillery, carried out periodic attacks by fire and ground forces against U.S. outposts at Con Thien, Gio Linh, Camp Carroll, and Khe Sanh.


Examine the failure of U.S. Gen. William Westmoreland's strategy against the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfareThe search-and-destroy tactics of U.S. ground troops proved ineffective in the fluid guerrilla war waged by the Viet Cong.

These larger engagements attracted most of the public's attention, but they were not in fact typical of the war in South Vietnam. Most "battles" of the war were sharp, very brief engagements between units of fewer than 200 men. Many of these lasted only a few hours, often only a few minutes, but nevertheless could result in heavy casualties. Overall, communist casualties far outnumbered U.S. casualties, but the North Vietnamese never came close to depleting their manpower. In any case, the communists could, when necessary, ease the pressure on themselves by withdrawing their forces to sanctuaries in nearby Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. Hanoi, not Washington, largely controlled the tempo of the ground war.


B-52 bombing during the Vietnam WarBoeing B-52 Stratofortress, a U.S. high-altitude bomber, dropping a stream of bombs over Vietnam.

Like the ground war in the South, the air campaign against the North continued to grow in scope and destructiveness but remained indecisive. By the end of 1966, the United States had dropped more bombs on North Vietnam than it had dropped on Japan during World War II and more than it had dropped during the entire Korean War. Yet the bombing seemed to have little impact on the communists' ability to carry on the war. North Vietnam was primarily an agricultural country with few industries to destroy. Many of the necessities of Hanoi's war effort came directly from China and the Soviet Union, which competed with each other to demonstrate support for Ho Chi Minh's "heroic" war against U.S. imperialism. The Soviets provided an estimated 1.8 billion rubles in military and economic aid and sent 3,000 military advisers and technicians along with sophisticated weapons to the North. China spent an estimated two billion dollars in assisting Hanoi; at the height of its effort, it had more than 300,000 engineering, medical, and anti-aircraft artillery troops in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Even when bombing knocked out more than 80 percent of the North's petroleum-storage facilities during the summer of 1966, the CIA reported no discernible shortages of petroleum or disruption of transportation. While the air raids continued, North Vietnam progressively strengthened its air defenses with the help of the latest radars, anti-aircraft guns, missiles, and modern jet fighters supplied by the Soviets and Chinese. By the end of 1966 the United States had already lost almost 500 aircraft and hundreds of air crewmen killed or held as prisoners of war.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Tet brings the war home

Protest against the Vietnam WarProtesters demonstrating against the Vietnam War, New York City, April 27, 1968.


Vietnam WarDemonstrator offering a flower to a military police officer during a protest against the Vietnam War at the Pentagon, Arlington county, Virginia, U.S., October 21, 1967.

By 1967 growing numbers of Americans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the war. Some, especially students, intellectuals, academics, and clergymen, opposed the war on moral grounds, pointing out that large numbers of civilians in both the North and the South were becoming the chief victims of the war and that the United States was in reality supporting a corrupt and oppressive dictatorship in Saigon. Campus protests became common, and youthful picketers sometimes ringed the White House, chanting, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?" In October 1967 at least 35,000 demonstrators staged a mass protest outside the Pentagon. Many more Americans, not part of any peace movement, opposed the war because of the increasing American casualties and the lack of evidence that the United States was winning. Still other Americans believed that Johnson was not doing what was necessary to win the war and was obliging the military to fight "with one hand tied behind its back." By the summer of 1967 fewer than 50 percent of polled citizens said they supported the president's conduct of the war.

In Hanoi the communist leadership was also becoming impatient with the progress of the war. Although pleased with their ability to hold their own against the more-numerous and better-armed Americans and their South Vietnamese allies, they were aware that the United States showed no sign of giving up its hopes of victory and indeed had continued to pour more troops into Vietnam. In the summer of 1967 the communists decided on a bold stroke that would cripple the Saigon government and destroy once and for all American expectations of success. Their plan was to launch simultaneous military attacks at cities, towns, and military installations, combined with popular uprisings throughout the country. The "general offensive/general uprising" was scheduled to occur during the Lunar New Year festival, or Tet, early in 1968.
To distract attention from their preparations and attract U.S. forces away from the large cities, the communists launched diversionary attacks in October 1967 against the important but isolated town of Dak To in the central highlands and against Loc Ninh on the route to Saigon.

Finally, beginning in late January 1968, two North Vietnamese divisions began a prolonged offensive against the Marine base at Khe Sanh, in the northwest corner of South Vietnam near the Laotian border. Like other bases along the DMZ, Khe Sanh was within range of artillery in North Vietnam, and, beginning on January 21, the North Vietnamese unleashed a heavy barrage against it. News reports repeatedly drew comparisons between Khe Sanh and the siege of the French fortress at Dien Bien Phu. Both the president and General Westmoreland were convinced that Khe Sanh was the enemy's main objective and that signs of a communist buildup in the urban areas were merely a diversion.


execution of a suspected Viet Cong officer in the Vietnam WarSouth Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan executing suspected Viet Cong officer Nguyen Van Lem in Saigon, South Vietnam, February 1, 1968.


Learn about the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong's surprise attacks and occupation of HueOn January 31, 1968, at the beginning of the traditional New Year festival of Tet, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched an all-out offensive.

Exactly the opposite was the case. On January 31, while approximately 50,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops were occupied in defending or supporting Khe Sanh and other DMZ bases, the communists launched an offensive throughout South Vietnam. They attacked 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 64 district capitals, five of the six major cities, and more than two dozen airfields and bases. Westmoreland's Saigon headquarters came under attack, and a VC squad even penetrated the compound of the U.S. embassy. In Hue, the former imperial Vietnamese capital, communist troops seized control of more than half the city and held it for nearly three weeks.


Discover the effect of the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive on American morale despite the attack's failureThe Tet Offensive was a military failure for the Viet Cong, but, at the same time, it devastated the American public's support for the war.

Although taken by surprise, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces struck back quickly against the often poorly coordinated attacks. With the exception of Hue, the communists were unable to hold any town or base for more than a day or two, and their forces suffered extremely heavy casualties. South Vietnamese soldiers, often defending their homes and families, fought surprisingly well, and nowhere did the population rise up to support the Viet Cong. Indeed, so destructive were some communist attacks that many in the local population, while still disliking the Saigon government, became far less supportive of the Viet Cong.

U.S. and South Vietnamese troops may have recovered quickly, but that was not true of Americans at home. The Tet Offensive sent shock waves throughout the United States, startling those who had believed the White House's claims that victory was near and convincing those with doubts that the situation was even worse than they had imagined. Television coverage of the destructive fighting in Saigon and Hue was extensive and graphic and left many with the impression that the United States and its ally were in desperate straits. Many in Washington still expected a major battle at Khe Sanh or further large communist attacks elsewhere.


Clark Clifford, 1968.

As criticism of Johnson's leadership by political leaders and the media mounted, the public was shocked to read in a New York Times headline story on March 10 that General Westmoreland had requested 206,000 additional troops for Vietnam. This news was widely interpreted as confirmation that the U.S. situation in Vietnam must be dire indeed. In fact, Westmoreland, assessing the Tet attacks as a serious defeat for the communists, wanted the additional troops to deliver a knockout blow against the weakened enemy. He had been encouraged to request the troops by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who saw this as an opportunity finally to mobilize the reserves and reconstitute a strategic reserve for use in contingencies other than Vietnam. The president turned the request over to his new secretary of defense, Clark Clifford, who had replaced a disillusioned McNamara a few weeks before. Clifford soon decided not only that massive reinforcements were ill-advised but that the entire war effort had to be reassessed.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Total number of deaths

Estimates of the total number of deaths in the Vietnam War vary widely. The wide disparity among the estimates cited below is partially explained by the different time periods of the Vietnam War covered by the studies and whether casualties in Cambodia and Laos were included in the estimates.

A 1975 US Senate subcommittee estimated around 1.4 million civilian casualties in South Vietnam because of the war, including 415,000 deaths. An estimate by the Department of Defense after the war gave a figure of 1.2 million civilian casualties, including 195,000 deaths.

According to statistics from the South Vietnamese Ministry of Health, 44.5% of civilians admitted to hospitals between 1967 and 1970 were wounded by mines or mortars, 21.2% by guns or grenades, and 34.3% by artillery or bombing.

Guenter Lewy in 1978 estimated 1,353,000 total deaths in North and South Vietnam during the period 1965–1974 in which the U.S. was most engaged in the war. Lewy reduced the number of Viet Cong (VC) and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) battle deaths claimed by the U.S. by 30 percent (in accordance with the opinion of United States Department of Defense officials), and assumed that one third of the reported battle deaths of the PAVN/VC may have actually been civilians. He estimates that between 30 and 46% of the total war deaths were civilians.

Deaths in Vietnam War (1965–1974) per Guenter Lewy

US and allied military deaths	282,000
PAVN/VC military deaths	444,000–666,000
Civilian deaths (North and South Vietnam)	405,000–627,000
Total deaths	1,353,000

A 1995 demographic study in Population and Development Review calculated 791,000–1,141,000 war-related Vietnamese deaths, both soldiers and civilians, for all of Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The study came up with a most likely Vietnamese death toll of 882,000, which included 655,000 adult males (above 15 years of age), 143,000 adult females, and 84,000 children. Those totals include only Vietnamese deaths, and do not include American and other allied military deaths which amounted to about 64,000. The study's authors stated that methodological limitations of the study include imbalance between rural and urban areas and the potential exclusion of high mortality areas. Another potential limitation is the relatively small sample size of the study.

In 1995, the Vietnamese government released its estimate of war deaths for the more lengthy period of 1955–75. PAVN and VC losses were reported as 1.1 million dead and civilian deaths of Vietnamese on both sides totaled 2.0 million. These estimates probably include deaths of Vietnamese soldiers in Laos and Cambodia, but do not include deaths of South Vietnamese and allied soldiers which would add nearly 300,000 for a grand total of 3.4 million military and civilian dead.

A 2008 study by the BMJ (formerly British Medical Journal) came up with a higher toll of 3,812,000 dead in Vietnam between 1955 and 2002. For the period of the Vietnam War the totals are 1,310,000 between 1955 and 1964, 1,700,000 between 1965–74 and 810,000 between 1975 and 1984. (The estimates for 1955–64 are much higher than other estimates). The sum of those totals is 3,091,000 war deaths between 1955 and 1975.

Uppsala University in Sweden maintains the Armed Conflict Database. Their estimates for conflict deaths in Vietnam are 164,923 from 1955 to 1964 and 1,458,050 from 1965 to 1975 for a total of 1,622,973. The database also estimates combat deaths in Cambodia for the years 1967–75 to total 259,000. Data for deaths in Laos is incomplete.

R. J. Rummel's mid-range estimate in 1997 was that the total deaths due to the Vietnam War totaled 2,450,000 from 1954 to 1975. Rummel calculated PAVN/VC deaths at 1,062,000 and ARVN and allied war deaths of 741,000, with both totals including civilians inadvertently killed. He estimated that victims of democide (deliberate killing of civilians) included 214,000 by North Vietnam/VC and 98,000 by South Vietnam and its allies. Deaths in Cambodia and Laos were estimated at 273,000 and 62,000 respectively.

Deaths in Vietnam War (1954–75) per R. J. Rummel (except where otherwise noted)

	Low estimate of deaths	Middle estimate of deaths	High estimate of deaths	Notes and comments
North Vietnam/Viet Cong military and civilian war dead	533,000	1,062,000	1,489,000	includes an estimated 50,000/65,000/70,000 civilians killed by U.S/SVN bombing/shelling[9]
South Vietnam/U.S./South Korea war military and civilian war dead	429,000	741,000	1,119,000	includes 360,000/391,000/720,000 civilians[10]
Democide by North Vietnam/Viet Cong	131,000	214,000	302,000	25,000/50,000/75,000 killed in North Vietnam, 106,000/164,000/227,000 killed in South Vietnam
Democide by South Vietnam	57,000	89,000	284,000	Democide is the murder of persons by or at the behest of governments.
Democide by the United States	4,000	6,000	10,000	Democide is the murder of persons by or at the behest of governments.
Democide by South Korea	3,000	3,000	3,000	Rummel does not give a medium or high estimate.
Subtotal Vietnam	1,156,000	2,115,000	3,207,000
Cambodians	273,000	273,000	273,000	Rummel estimates 212,000 killed by Khmer Rouge (1967–1975), 60,000 killed by U.S. and 1,000 killed by South Vietnam (1967–73). No estimate given for deaths caused by Viet Cong/North Vietnam (1954–75).[8]
Laotians	28,000	62,000	115,000	[5]
Grand total of war deaths: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (1954–75)	1,450,000	2,450,000	3,595,000

It's what the US Military wont tell you is that 210.000 Soldiers returned home committed Suicide suffering from PTSD ...


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The Honor Flight Bay Area Chapter 10/2023

SPC 5 Tatum Paul D. US Army / Viet Nam Veteran Combat Graduate

As a veteran chosen by the Honor Flight Bay Area (California) Foundation to be part of Honor Flight 32, my excitement was building in the early morning hours of Thursday, October 19, 2023. I didn't know what to expect when I left my car transport and entered the San Francisco International Airport at Alaska Airlines Gate 2, Door 1. We met in an area of the airport that served as a gathering place for the 27 Honored Veterans and Guardians; it was a spot to assemble and bond with each other for the journey ahead. This was hard for me because I don't bond easily as a result of my PTSD and other wounds stemming from my wartime experiences. The gathering hole was filling up with Red and Blue shirts and the overall age of this group was just my style — seasoned. The Staff in the White shirts mustered us to explain the itinerary and the rules of the flight, and give us an overview of what was in store for us.

The group was getting restless and excited as we headed toward the Security Gate check point and the flight departure time grew near. We were happy to see no one was left behind due to any contraband carry-ons. We headed to the Gate area in our wheelchairs, ready to take on coffee and snacks and last instructions before boarding. Our flight would take about 5 hours, and would land at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Northern Virginia.

Now this is the time to take you back to the 1970s when I was released and discharged from the United States Army at Fort Lewis (Washington). It didn't go well for many of us when we re-entered the civilian population and came in contact with people. We were greeted with human spit and vulgar scorn, trash was thrown at us, and at times there was rough physical contact. This was not what I expected to encounter on coming home. I was made to feel humiliated and disgusted by what I had been trained to do in order to save the world from tyranny. I failed to win that war and save the world — and I felt it was true what they screamed at me: "human baby killer, murderers…." I have never recovered from my war, never forgotten what I did, and I have been living in fear and silence for the past 53 years. This was a true horror that we experienced. It caused traumatic impairment, and we all had to both carry it and face it when we came home. And yet, I felt alone. I felt I had no dignity left as a human. Yes, hurry … Uncle Sam Needs You.

As a Soldier from the Viet Nam Era, I discovered most people either hated or loved you. But mostly they hated us because of the crimes against humanity that we did inflict. Civilians were unfair in their judgment against all service members and acted stupidly and with malice. They had no compassion or understanding of what our job was. We all still carry this burden today — along with the disabilities and mental afflictions we acquired from both the battlefield and the "homecoming."

Now, let's move back to the present and Honor Flight 32.

We landed on time. Civilians disembarked from the plane first. Several of the vets were in wheelchairs, including me. Our group was led to a staging area just Inside the main entrance to the terminal. The doors opened, and we were greeted by about 300 people, including honored dignitaries. Cheering erupted with "Welcome home!" and applause filled the terminal. This was overwhelming, and as tears dripped from my face, I found it hard to believe this greeting was all for us — a real welcoming home. Along the pathway through the terminal, people came up to us, to touch and shake our hands, and with joy in their hearts, they welcomed us home. This continued while we all boarded the charter bus to the Hilton Hotel where we were greeted again as we stepped down from the bus.

I looked around, and I saw our group members in tears and trying to comfort each other. We huddled by the front door of the Hotel, ready to be escorted inside. There was a lull for a moment as we all tried to steady our emotions. Thank God the bar was open and dinner was waiting in the main dining room. As we wheeled ourselves down the corridor, it felt as though we were "Coming into the Light." We were all filled with a kind of wonder, and ready to share our feelings with each other about the arrival. This experience will never dissolve from out hearts, it was the best of times. And with that glow and warmth among us, dinner was served.

The next morning at Reveille, we slowly rolled into the dining hall, still under the influence from the night before. We took turns at the breakfast buffet, and as we ate, we shared more stories revealing our military experiences. There was a long day ahead of us, so better buck up and get with the program!

And the next two days were full. We visited each Military Memorial and National Site: National Museum of the US Army; World War II Memorial; Arlington National Cemetery; Military Women's Memorial; Korean War Veterans Memorial; Viet Nam Veterans Memorial; US Navy Memorial; US Air Force Memorial; US Marine Corps Memorial (Iwo Jima); The Pentagon; The White House; The Capitol Building; and the Washington Monument. At the Navy Museum, there was a special performance by the Honor Guard for us — the Veterans of Viet Nam.

And lastly, here is the story of the Flight Home to the Bay Area, and my reflections on this trip.

After two long days In Virginia and Washington DC, we were ready to return home. We were certainly in a better and happier disposition than when we started out — we now had a kind of resolution and peace of mind. I took refuge in knowing I was a liberated person now, free of persecution and resentment for doing my job overseas, released from the stigma of betrayal from the public eye. We boarded the bus and headed to the Reagan Airport. We disembarked from the bus and moved inside the terminal into the RSA check point. It was good to see all the Veterans laughing and scratching and having a good time with each other. We were more at ease now, and we felt fulfilled. Another 5 hour flight to San Francisco — everyone closed their window shade and took a long nap.

When our flight was minutes away from landing at SFO, I realized it had been a long flight for us senior citizens. Yet we all snapped to attention as the wheels touched down. We were ready to disembark and head home. That didn't happen right away! Again, we let the civilians off first, and our group was held at the staging door inside the terminal. The doors opened and all I could see was a mass of people cheering and holding up posters that said "Welcome Home." People rushed up to hug us and the cheering was quite loud. Again, tears came to my eyes. Warm and fuzzy emotions overwhelmed me again, just as it did at Reagan Airport a few days earlier.

It was difficult to move to the front gate because of all the cheering people; but there was one more surprise ahead of us. We never got a parade when we returned home — we got nothing — zip — not even a "Welcome Home." So today we were about to have a real parade, just for us. We all lined up three across and the Flight Leader Timothy gave us the "Welcome Home" address. This was very moving. I heard bagpipes in the background, and I saw the Honor Guard and Service Troops holding their flags in front of us. Civilians lined the pathway, still cheering and and holding up their signs.

We were all truly Honored and overwhelmed! What came next was a real parade just for us all the way to the front door. Tears never stopped. I felt loved and respected as a Soldier, a feeling I never experienced 53 years ago. I could not stop crying! My emotions were out of control and we had only travelled 100 feet down the terminal. I looked back and all the Veterans were in tears and holding their heads high — absorbing all the love and warmth that filled the terminal. To me, this was over the top and so well presented. Everyone gave back to us Veterans, they show us we are all respected, and they gave us what we never had on our Return from War.

By participating in this journey, I have made new Veteran connections with my lost brothers.

A very big "Thank you" to all Honor Flight Bay Area Staff.
A special Thank you to Ethan Frazier my Guardian

Sponsors and Contributors
Veterans Administration
American Legion
Alaska Air Lines
Dovenmuehle
VFW
National Vet Center
VSO

Coordinators and Staff
Connie Johnson Coordinator
Carolyn Wong Coordinators
Timothy Smith Flight Leader
Gary Laine Asst Leader / Trip Portraits
Valarie Rick Flight Nurse
Donna Colombo Flight Photographer / Tour Guide

Recipients
US Army
US Navy
US Air Force
US Marine Corps
US Coast Guard

This has been a great Honor to be welcomed home.


Paul David Tatum

 

[whitefish]

Cambodian genocide

Skulls of Khmer Rouge victims

Cambodian genocide, systematic murder of up to three million people in Cambodia from 1976 to 1978 that was carried out by the Khmer Rouge government under Pol Pot.

Immediately after World War II, the Americans and the French fought wars against communism in Korea and Vietnam, respectively. Cambodia became independent in 1953 when French Indochina collapsed under the assault of Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh communist army. Cambodia's constitutional monarchy under Prince Sihanouk remained neutral during the Vietnam War, until he was ousted in 1970 by an American-backed coup. Forced to seek refuge in Beijing, he became the figurehead for communist Khmer Rouge insurgents, whose cause was greatly aided when the United States bombed Cambodia in an attempt to suppress guerrilla activity. Cambodia's civil war ended in 1975 when capital city Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge, who renamed the country Kampuchea.

Pol Pot declared 1975 to be "Year Zero," when Cambodia was to be isolated and its society remade in accordance with communist ideals. Civil rights and property rights were immediately eliminated, and any public expression of religious belief was forbidden. Taking the view that Cambodian society had been corrupted by exposure to the world beyond Cambodia's borders, the new regime started destroying evidence of Western influence, emptying cities and force-marching the urban population into the countryside to engage in hopelessly inadequate agricultural projects. As starvation and disease set in, these actions alone would have created a significant humanitarian disaster.

The Khmer Rouge also persecuted and killed minorities, particularly ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese, in large numbers. Other targets included Cham Muslims, of whom 70–80 percent of the population was exterminated; professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers; and anyone who could remotely be described as "intellectual," which included anyone wearing spectacles or who could speak a foreign language. The Tuol Sleng Prison in Phnom Penh became a center for mass murder, and there were rural sites—referred to as the Killing Fields, which is also the title of a 1984 film that brought the plight of Khmer Rouge victims to worldwide attention—where a huge number of people were executed. As hundreds of thousands of Cambodians fled into Thailand, the genocide intensified, with the Khmer Rouge turning on itself and murdering thousands of suspected traitors and spies in its ranks.


Victims of the Cambodian genocideVisitors viewing an exhibit showing photos of victims of the Cambodian genocide; at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

By November 1978, when Vietnam invaded and put an end to the Khmer Rouge's excesses, at least 1.25 million and as many as 3 million Cambodians had died as a result of Khmer Rouge action; Cambodia's population had been 7.5 million. Even though the Khmer Rouge kept extensive records, many disappeared into Vietnamese archives, and so the exact number of victims has not been ascertained; the working consensus is 2 million.

In 1979, following the Khmer Rouge's defeat at the hands of Vietnamese forces, the movement's de facto leader fled into the jungles on Cambodia's border with Thailand where he maintained the pretense of leading a legitimate government. Pol Pot died in 1998 while under house arrest imposed by rivals within the Khmer Rouge, which largely disintegrated afterward. Vietnam occupied Cambodia until 1989, and free elections were held in 1993, inaugurating a democratic government.

The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, formally known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, was established in 2006 as an effort to bring surviving leaders to justice, and trials held under its auspices secured a number of convictions. In 2012 Kaing Guek Eav, the commandant of Tuol Sleng Prison, was sentenced to life in prison for crimes against humanity; he died in 2020. In 2018 Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, two high-ranking Khmer Rouge officials, were convicted of genocide. The Tribunal ceased active litigation in 2022 but has not been decommissioned.


Tuol Sleng Genocide MuseumThe Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum located in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

The genocide is a locus of Cambodian memory today. Under the Vietnamese occupation, part of the Tuol Sleng Prison, also called S-21, was converted into a museum, and today it sees significant visitation from Cambodians and foreign tourists alike. Signs across the rural countryside mark the sites of former killing fields. An extensive Cambodian exodus to the United States followed the years of genocide, and observances by expatriates are held at Chicago's National Cambodian Heritage Museum and Killing Fields Memorial and elsewhere in the country.

Khmer Rouge,

Radical communist movement that ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 after winning power through a guerrilla war. It was purportedly set up in 1967 as the armed wing of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge government under Pol Pot was responsible for the Cambodian genocide (1976-78), during which up to three million people were murdered.

Cambodia's communist movement originated in the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party, which was formed in 1951 under the auspices of the Viet Minh of Vietnam. The party's largely French-educated Marxist leaders eventually renamed it the Communist Party of Kampuchea. By the late 1950s the party's members were engaged in clandestine activities against the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, but for many years they made little headway against Sihanouk from their bases in remote jungle and mountain areas, partly because of Sihanouk's own popularity among the peasants whom the communists sought to incite to rebellion.

After a right-wing military coup toppled Sihanouk in 1970, however, the Khmer Rouge entered into a political coalition with him and began attracting increased support in the Cambodian countryside, a trend that was accelerated by the destructive U.S. bombing campaigns over Cambodia in the early 1970s. By this time the Khmer Rouge were also receiving substantial aid from North Vietnam, which had withheld its support during the years of Sihanouk's rule.


Pol Pot, 1980.

In a civil war that continued for nearly five years from 1970, the Khmer Rouge gradually expanded the areas of the Cambodian countryside under their control. Finally, in April 1975, Khmer Rouge forces mounted a victorious attack on the capital city of Phnom Penh and established a national government to rule Cambodia. The military leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, became the new government's prime minister. The Khmer Rouge's rule over the next four years was marked by some of the worst excesses of any Marxist government in the 20th century, during which an estimated 1.5 million (and possibly up to 2 million) Cambodians died and many of the country's professional and technical class were exterminated.

The Khmer Rouge government was overthrown in 1979 by invading Vietnamese troops, who installed a puppet government propped up by Vietnamese aid and expertise. The Khmer Rouge retreated to remote areas and resumed guerrilla warfare, this time operating from bases near the border with Thailand and obtaining aid from China. In 1982 they formed a fragile coalition (under the nominal leadership of Sihanouk) with two noncommunist Khmer groups opposed to the Vietnamese-backed central government. The Khmer Rouge was the strongest partner in this coalition, which carried on guerrilla warfare until 1991. The Khmer Rouge opposed the United Nations-sponsored peace settlement of 1991 and the multiparty elections in 1993, and they continued guerrilla warfare against the noncommunist coalition government formed after those elections.

Isolated in the remote western provinces of the country and increasingly dependent on gem smuggling for their funding, the Khmer Rouge suffered a series of military defeats and grew weaker from year to year. In 1995 many of their cadres accepted an offer of amnesty from the Cambodian government, and in 1996 one of their leading figures, Ieng Sary, defected along with several thousand guerrillas under his command and signed a peace agreement with the government. The disarray within the organization intensified in 1997, when Pol Pot was arrested by other Khmer Rouge leaders and sentenced to life imprisonment. Pol Pot died in 1998, and soon afterward the surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge defected or were imprisoned.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

In the Past Decade, VA Has Recouped $2.4 Billion in Separation Pay, Bonuses from Disabled Vets

In the past decade, the Department of Veterans Affairs has recouped more than $2 billion from veterans who received separation pay from the Defense Department and later filed for disability compensation, an effort that has resulted in financial hardship for some former service members.

According to data provided by the VA, the department has collected $2.44 billion from 112,834 veterans since 2013 under a law that department officials say prohibits it from paying disability compensation to those who received voluntary or involuntary separation pay or bonuses until the money has been recouped.

While the VA has been required to recover the money since the 1940s – and the Defense Department is required to inform transitioning service members of this potential transaction – veterans have been surprised when the recoupment letters arrive, in some cases decades after they received the money.

Read Next: FBI Arrests Marine Veteran After He Self-Published Book on His Role in Jan. 6 Riot at Capitol

Former Air Force officer Raymond Thomas received $30,000 in separation pay in 1990 and, following a series of government administrative missteps, was told earlier this year his monthly disability compensation, which he uses to cover his vehicle and living quarters, would be withheld completely until the money was returned.

Thomas reached a payment agreement with the VA after he told his story to Military.com, but he still feels like the problem should have been resolved in the years following his release from military duty.

Vernon Reffitt, who served as a dog handler in the Army for more than 13 years, was awarded a $38,000 incentive to leave the service in 1992 as part of the drawdown following the 1991 Persian Gulf War. At the same time, he received a 10% disability rating from the VA and has been getting a small check for more than 30 years.

When he applied for benefits under the PACT Act, his claim was denied, but the VA noticed he had received a separation bonus and started recoupment efforts.

"It's not the VA's money," Reffitt said Monday during an interview with Military.com. "It was given to me by the Army as part of a drawdown situation, so that I would not stay in the military. ... I got my VA disability rating the same day and collected both. Why would the Army give me $30,000 [after taxes] that the VA could just take back the next day? It's stupid."

According to VA data, the recoupment effort hit a peak in 2018 with the department collecting more than $396 million from 17,066 veterans. Last year, it collected nearly $148 million from more than 9,000 former service members.

VA spokesman Gary Kunich said the department tries to identify those who are required to repay "as early as possible" and understands that the effort may present a hardship to some veterans.

He added that, since September 2021, the VA has taken steps to resolve recoupment cases more efficiently and is making an effort to ensure that veterans understand the process when they file a disability compensation claim.

For those already receiving benefits, the VA will "work with them every step of the way to minimize any impact this may have on them," Kunich said.

A bill was introduced last year, the Restore Veterans' Compensation Act, by Reps. Ruben Gallego, D-Ariz., and Gus Bilirakis, R-Fla., that would eliminate the requirement for VA to recoup separation pay and incentive payments for veterans who receive disability compensation, but it has not been considered by either the House Armed Services or Veterans Affairs committees.

Reffitt said he'd like to see the legislation passed because the recoupment effort is "just wrong."

"The No. 1 thing I'd like to see happen is for the recoupment to stop. There's no reason to give somebody money just to take it back 30 years later. Either stop giving bonuses or stop the recoupment. And the other thing is, if you are wrong, pay for it."

He said when he accepted the separation pay, he knew that he would have to pay it back if he returned to military service and eventually retired. He had no idea that the VA had any authority over collecting money from disability pay.

"If the Army's wrong for putting this out under false pretenses, then they need to pay. If the VA is wrong in missing me for 30 years, then they need to just suffer the loss. It shouldn't be me all stressed out and anxious because they made a mistake," Reffitt said.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The Navy's First Vietnamese Admiral Saw His Family Killed by an Infamous Viet Cong Guerrilla

Rear Adm. Huan Nguyen during his 2019 promotion ceremony. (U.S. Navy)

When South Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese forces in 1975, an estimated 125,000 Vietnamese refugees fled to the United States to avoid retribution at the hands of the North Vietnamese. Among those refugees was U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Huan Nguyen, the first Vietnamese-American ever to hold an admiral's rank. Nguyen's road to becoming a distinguished Navy officer was a long and tragic one, and begins with one of the war's most iconic photographs.

"America is the beacon of hope for all of us. There is no other place in the world where a person can go for such opportunity," Nguyen said at his 2019 promotion ceremony.Eddie Adams' photo of Viet Cong guerrilla Bay Lop being executed by South Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan made newspapers around the world in 1968. It became one of the most enduring images of the Vietnam War.

The photo fueled the anti-war movement back in the United States, which saw the photo as proof that the war was unjustified. But Adams' photo only tells half the story, as the former Marine Corps photographer admitted.

Bay Lop was executed in Saigon, on the second day of the Tet Offensive. He was captured after murdering South Vietnamese Lt. Col. Nguyen Tuan, along with the officer's wife, mother and six of his children. One of his children survived, however, after being shot through the arm and thigh. Another bullet pierced his skull.

1968, file photo, South Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan, chief of the National Police, fires his pistol into the head of suspected Viet Cong officer Nguyen Van Lem (also known as Bay Lop) on a Saigon street, early in the Tet Offensive. Early on the morning of Jan. 31, 1968, as Vietnamese celebrated the Lunar New Year, or Tet as it is known locally, Communist forces launched a wave of coordinated surprise attacks across South Vietnam. The campaign, one of the largest of the Vietnam War, led to intense fighting and heavy casualties in cities and towns across the South.

Nine-year-old Huan Nguyen stayed next to his mother for two hours after the murders. When night fell, he escaped the scene and avoided the communist guerrillas. The young boy was taken in by his uncle, a colonel in the South Vietnamese Air Force. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the officer and Nguyen escaped to the United States.

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps troops took care of the family as they made their way through Guam, along with thousands of other refugees, before being sponsored for relocation in the United States. U.S. Air Force Col. Ed Veiluva sponsored the family, which was resettled in Oklahoma as political refugees. By 1981, Nguyen earned a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from Oklahoma State University. He later earned master's degrees in electrical engineering, engineering and information technology. In 1993, he received a direct commission in the U.S. Navy through the Reserve Engineering Duty Officer Program.

Huan Nguyen was promoted to rear admiral in October 2019, at the time the highest-ranking Vietnamese-born officer in the U.S. Navy.

"The images that I remember vividly when I arrived at Camp Asan, Guam, now Asan Beach Park, were of American sailors and Marines toiling in the hot sun, setting up tents and chow halls, distributing water and hot food, helping and caring for the people with dignity and respect," Nguyen said. "I thought to myself how lucky I am to be in a place like America. Those sailors inspired me to later serve in the United States Navy."


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The fall of South Vietnam

Fall of Saigon during the Vietnam WarAir America helicopter evacuating Vietnamese officials and their families from the roof of an apartment building at 22 Gia Long Street in Saigon, South Vietnam, April 29, 1975.

On March 29, 1973, the last U.S. military unit left Vietnam. By that time the communists and South Vietnamese were already engaged in what journalists labeled the "postwar war." Both sides alleged, more or less accurately, that the other side was continuously violating the terms of the peace agreements. The United States maintained its program of extensive military aid to Saigon, but the president's ability to influence events in Vietnam was being sharply curtailed. As Nixon's personal standing crumbled under the weight of Watergate revelations, Congress moved to block any possibility of further military action in Vietnam. In the summer of 1973 Congress passed a measure prohibiting any U.S. military operations in or over Indochina after August 15. Congress went a step further on November 7, 1973, when it overrode Nixon's veto to pass the War Powers Act, a law that, in theory, required the president to consult with Congress before committing U.S. forces abroad.



See how communist forces turned Saigon into Ho Chi Minh City and created the Socialist Republic of VietnamIn the spring of 1975 the North Vietnamese army conquered all of South Vietnam, and the following year North and South were formally united in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The following year saw a discernible pattern of hostilities: lower levels of combat and casualties but unimpeded warfare along the never-defined zones of control of the South Vietnamese government and the communists. Hundreds of Vietnamese continued to lose their lives each day after the fighting was supposed to have stopped. By the summer of 1974 Nixon had resigned in disgrace, Congress had cut military and economic aid to Vietnam by 30 percent, and the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia appeared close to defeat. Thieu's government, corrupt and inefficient as ever, now faced enormous difficulties with inflation, unemployment, apathy, and an enormous desertion rate in the army. After an easy success at Phuoc Long, northeast of Saigon, in December 1974–January 1975, the Hanoi leaders believed that victory was near.


Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger during the Fall of SaigonU.S. Pres. Gerald Ford and senior advisers receiving an update from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger about the evacuation of U.S. personnel from Saigon, South Vietnam (now Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam), April 29, 1975.


fall of SaigonTranscript of helicopter radio transmissions during the fall of Saigon, South Vietnam (now Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam).

In early March the North Vietnamese launched the first phase of what was expected to be a two-year offensive to secure South Vietnam. As it happened, the South's government and army collapsed in less than two months. Thousands of ARVN troops retreated in disorder, first from the central highlands and then from Hue and Da Nang. Gerald R. Ford, who had succeeded Nixon as U.S. president, pleaded in vain with Congress for additional military aid that might at least raise Saigon's morale. But members of Congress, like most of their constituents, were ready to wash their hands of a long and futile war. On April 21 Thieu resigned and flew to Taiwan. On April 30 what remained of the South Vietnamese government surrendered unconditionally, and NVA tank columns occupied Saigon without a struggle. The remaining Americans escaped in a series of frantic air- and sealifts with Vietnamese friends and coworkers. A military government was instituted, and on July 2, 1976, the country was officially united as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with its capital in Hanoi. Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City. The 30-year struggle for control over Vietnam was over.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran