Sticky Military and Veterans thread

[Charvelx04]

Love how you've taken this thread and ran with it.

 

[whitefish]

De-escalation, negotiation, and Vietnamization

Creighton Abrams and Lyndon B. Johnson Creighton Abrams, U.S. commander in South Vietnam, speaking as Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson (center) and his advisers listen, 1968.

With the aid of some of the president's other advisers and elder statesmen from the Democratic Party, Clifford succeeded in persuading Johnson that the present number of U.S. troops in Vietnam (about 550,000) should constitute an upper limit and that Johnson, as chief executive, should make a dramatic gesture for peace. In a nationally televised speech on March 31, Johnson announced that he was "taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict" by halting the bombing of North Vietnam (except in the areas near the DMZ) and that the United States was prepared to send representatives to any forum to seek a negotiated end to the war. He followed this surprising declaration with news that he did not intend to seek reelection that year.

Three days later Hanoi announced that it was prepared to talk to the Americans. Discussions began in Paris on May 13 but led nowhere. Hanoi insisted that, before serious negotiations could begin, the United States would have to halt its bombing of the rest of Vietnam. Meanwhile, fighting continued at a high intensity. The communist high command determined to follow the Tet attacks with two more waves in May and August. At the same time, Westmoreland ordered his commanders to "keep maximum pressure" on the communist forces in the South, which he believed had been seriously weakened by their losses at Tet. The result was the fiercest fighting of the war. In the eight weeks following Johnson's speech, 3,700 Americans were killed in Vietnam and 18,000 wounded. The communists were reported by Westmoreland's headquarters as having lost about 43,000 killed. The ARVN's losses were not recorded, but they were usually twice that of the Americans.

In October the Soviets secretly informed Washington that the North Vietnamese would be willing to halt their attacks across the DMZ and begin serious negotiation with the United States and South Vietnam if the United States halted all bombing of the North. Assured by his military advisers that such a halt would not adversely affect the military situation, Johnson announced the cessation of bombing on the last day of October. The bombing halt achieved no breakthrough but rather brought on a period of prolonged bickering between the United States and its South Vietnamese ally about the terms and procedures to govern the talks. By the time South Vietnam joined the talks, Richard M. Nixon had been elected president.

Nixon and his close adviser on foreign affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, recognized that the United States could not win a military victory in Vietnam but insisted that the war could be ended only by an "honourable" settlement that would afford South Vietnam a reasonable chance of survival. A hasty American withdrawal, they argued, would undermine U.S. credibility throughout the world. Although public opinion made it impossible to commit more troops, Nixon was still confident he could end the war with a favourable settlement. He planned to achieve this through bringing pressure to bear from the Soviets and China, both of whom were eager to improve their relations with the United States, and through the threat of massive force against North Vietnam. To signal to Hanoi that he could still inflict punishment by air, the president decided to act on the proposal of Gen. Creighton Abrams, who had succeeded Westmoreland in July 1968, that the United States bomb the secret communist base areas in Cambodia near the Vietnamese border.

When the communists launched another wave of attacks in South Vietnam in early 1969, Nixon secretly ordered the bombing to proceed. Cambodian premier Norodom Sihanouk, tired of his uninvited Vietnamese guests, had confidentially approved the attacks, and Hanoi was in no position to complain without revealing its own violation of Cambodia's neutrality. Although elaborate measures had been taken in Washington and Saigon to ensure that the air attacks be kept completely secret, the story broke in The New York Times in May. Infuriated by this breach of security, Nixon began a series of measures to plug "leaks" of information; these became part of a system of illegal surveillance and burglary that eventually led to the Watergate scandal of 1972.


Examine President Nixon's threefold plan to unilaterally de-escalate the Vietnam WarWhile conducting negotiations with North Vietnam, U.S. President Richard M. Nixon began a program of "de-escalation," or reduction of U.S. combat forces, and of "Vietnamization," or development of South Vietnam's ability to wage war on its own. From Vietnam Perspective (1985)

In view of the surprisingly good performance of the South Vietnamese army at Tet, and responding to growing pressure in the United States to begin a withdrawal of U.S. troops, the Nixon administration decided to accelerate a program to provide South Vietnam with the high-quality weapons and training that would enable them gradually to take over sole responsibility for fighting the ground war—a program labeled Vietnamization. In June 1969 Nixon announced the withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam. In September he announced further troop withdrawals, and by March 1970 he was announcing the phased withdrawal of 150,000 troops over the next year. Abrams protested that the still inexperienced and incompletely trained ARVN could hardly take over the job at such a rapid pace, but the withdrawals were enormously popular at home, and the White House soon found them politically indispensable.


My Lai MassacreVietnamese citizens photographed during the My Lai Massacre, March 16, 1968.

Though popular at home, the withdrawals lowered the morale of the troops remaining in Vietnam by underlining the apparent pointlessness of the war. By 1970 signs of serious problems in morale and leadership were seemingly everywhere. These signs included increased drug abuse, more frequent and serious racial incidents, and even "fraggings," the murder or deliberate maiming of commissioned and noncommissioned officers by their own troops with fragmentation weapons such as hand grenades. News of the My Lai Massacre, a mass murder by U.S. soldiers of several hundred civilians in Quang Ngai province in 1968, became public at the end of 1969, further undermining convictions about the righteousness of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam. From 1965 to 1973, more than 30,000 U.S. military personnel either in Vietnam or in service related to Vietnam received dishonorable discharges for desertion (though only a small number of desertions actually took place on the battlefield).

Another 10,000 deserters were still at large when the United States withdrew from the war in 1973; most of these took advantage of clemency programs offered under Pres. Gerald R. Ford in 1974 and Pres. Jimmy Carter in 1977. Also during the period 1965–73, about half a million men became "draft dodgers," illegally evading conscription into the armed forces or simply refusing to respond to their draft notices. More than 200,000 men were charged with draft evasion and more than 8,000 convicted. Of those convicted, most were either offered clemency by Ford or pardoned by Carter.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The United States negotiates a withdrawal

Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and Alexander Haig(From left) U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, Pres. Richard Nixon, and Deputy National Security Adviser Alexander Haig discussing the Vietnam War in Nixon's study at Camp David, Maryland, November 13, 1972.

While Vietnamization and troop withdrawals proceeded in Vietnam, the negotiations in Paris remained deadlocked. Kissinger secretly opened separate talks with high-level Vietnamese diplomats, but the two sides remained far apart. The Americans proposed a mutual withdrawal of both U.S. and North Vietnamese forces. Hanoi insisted on an unconditional U.S. withdrawal and on the replacement of the U.S.-backed regime of Nguyen Van Thieu by a neutral coalition government. Nixon considered using renewed bombing and a blockade of the North to coerce the communist leadership, but his military and intelligence experts advised him that such actions would not be likely to have a decisive effect, and his political advisers worried about the impact of such actions on an American public eager to see continued de-escalation of the war.


Witness American college students protesting U.S. attacks on sanctuaries for Vietnamese communist forces in Cambodia during the Vietnam WarLearn about American college students' protests against U.S. attacks on Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. From Vietnam Perspective (1985)

Nixon consequently refrained from striking North Vietnam, but he could not resist the opportunity to intervene in Cambodia, where a pro-Western government under Gen. Lon Nol had overthrown Sihanouk's neutralist regime in March 1970. Since that time, the new regime had attempted to force the communists out of their border sanctuaries. The North Vietnamese easily fended off the attacks of the Cambodian army and began to arm and support the Cambodian communist movement, known as the Khmer Rouge. Eager to support Lon Nol and destroy the sanctuaries, Nixon authorized a large sweep into the border areas by a U.S. and South Vietnamese force of 20,000 men. The allies captured enormous quantities of supplies and equipment but failed to trap any large enemy forces. In the United States, news of the Cambodian incursion triggered widespread protest and demonstrations. These became even more intense after National Guard troops opened fire on a crowd of protesters at Kent State University in Ohio, killing four students and wounding several others, on May 4. At hundreds of campuses, students "went on strike." Congress, meanwhile, repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

How the U.S. Army used fake poop during the Vietnam WarLearn more about technology in the Vietnam War.

By the summer of 1970 the White House was left with little more than Vietnamization and troop withdrawals as a way to end the war. Vietnamization appeared to be proceeding smoothly, and American counterinsurgency experts had moved swiftly after Tet to help the South Vietnamese government to develop programs to root out the Viet Cong's underground government and establish control of the countryside. The Viet Cong, seriously weakened by losses in the 1968–69 offensives, now found themselves on the defensive in many areas. However, the limits of Vietnamization were soon demonstrated, when in March 1971 a large ARVN attack into Laos, code-named Lam Son 719 and designed to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, ended in heavy casualties and a disorderly retreat.

In the United States, large-scale demonstrations were now less common, but disillusionment with the war was more widespread than ever. One poll claimed that 71 percent of Americans believed that the United States had "made a mistake" in sending troops to Vietnam and that 58 percent found the war "immoral." Discontent was particularly directed toward the Selective Service System, which had long been seen as unfairly conscripting young men from racial minorities and poor backgrounds while allowing more-privileged men to defer conscription by enrolling in higher education. College deferments were limited in 1971, but by that time the military was calling up fewer conscripts each year. Nixon ended all draft calls in 1972, and in 1973 the draft was abolished in favour of an all-volunteer military.

Encouraged by their success in Laos, the Hanoi leadership launched an all-out invasion of the South on March 30, 1972, spearheaded by tanks and supported by artillery. South Vietnamese forces at first suffered staggering defeats, but Nixon, in an operation code-named Linebacker, unleashed U.S. air power against the North, mined Haiphong Harbour (the principal entry point for Soviet seaborne supplies), and ordered hundreds of U.S. aircraft into action against the invasion forces and their supply lines. By mid-June the communists' Easter Offensive had ground to a halt.

With the failure of their offensive, Hanoi leaders were finally ready to compromise. The United States had indicated as early as 1971 that it would not insist on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South. Now Hanoi signaled in return that it would not insist on replacing Thieu with a coalition government. On the basis of these two concessions, Kissinger and North Vietnamese emissary Le Duc Tho secretly hammered out a complicated peace accord in October 1972. The Saigon government, however, balked at a peace agreement negotiated without its participation or consent and demanded important changes in the treaty. In November (following Nixon's reelection), Kissinger returned to Paris with some 69 suggested changes to the agreement designed to satisfy Thieu. The North Vietnamese responded with anger, then with proposed changes of their own. Nixon, exasperated with what he saw as the North's intransigence and also anxious to persuade Thieu to cooperate, ordered B-52 bombers again to attack Hanoi. This so-called Christmas bombing was the most intense bombing campaign of the war.


Hear U.S. President Richard M. Nixon announcing the January 1973 agreement to end the Vietnam WarLearn about the January 1973 agreement to end the Vietnam War, as announced by U.S. President Richard M. Nixon. From Vietnam Perspective (1985)

After eight days the North Vietnamese agreed to return to Paris to sign an agreement essentially the same as that agreed upon in October. Thieu, reassured by a massive influx of U.S. military aid and by a combination of promises and threats from Nixon, reluctantly agreed to go along. On January 27, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam was signed by representatives of the South Vietnamese communist forces, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States. A cease-fire would go into effect the following morning throughout North and South Vietnam, and within 60 days all U.S. forces would be withdrawn, all U.S. bases dismantled, and all prisoners of war (POWs) released. The issue of POWs would remain a controversial one for decades, despite the fact that there was no credible evidence to suggest that U.S. POWs had been kept secretly in Vietnam after the signing of the Paris accords (see Sidebar: Vietnam War POWs and MIAs). An international force would keep the peace, the South Vietnamese would have the right to determine their own future, and North Vietnamese troops could remain in the South but would not be reinforced. The 17th parallel would remain the dividing line until the country could be reunited by "peaceful means."


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Charlie Company

My Lai, a subdivision of Son My village, was located in the province of Quang Ngai, roughly 7 miles (11 km) northeast of Quang Ngai city. The area had been dubbed "Pinkville" by U.S. soldiers because of the reddish colour used to indicate the densely populated My Lai area on military maps. By the time Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Infantry Brigade, arrived in Vietnam in December 1967. "Pinkville" had earned a reputation as a heavily mined hotbed of Viet Cong activity. In January 1968 Charlie was one of three companies tasked with the destruction of the 48th Battalion, an especially effective Viet Cong unit operating in Quang Ngai province. Throughout February and early March, Charlie Company suffered dozens of casualties due to mines and booby traps, but it failed to engage the 48th Batallion. After the debacle of the broad Tet Offensive, the Viet Cong had returned to guerrilla tactics and tended to avoid direct encounters with U.S. forces.

Intelligence suggested that the 48th Batallion had taken refuge in the My Lai area (though in reality, that unit was in the western Quang Ngai highlands, more than 40 miles [65 km] away). In a briefing on March 15, Charlie Company's commander, Capt. Ernest Medina, told his men that they would finally be given the opportunity to fight the enemy that had eluded them for over a month. Believing that civilians had already left the area for Quang Ngai city, he directed that anyone found in My Lai should be treated as a Viet Cong fighter or sympathizer. Under these rules of engagement, soldiers were free to fire at anyone or anything. Moreover, the troops of Charlie Company were ordered to destroy crops and buildings and to kill livestock.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Massacre at My Lai

Shortly before 7:30 am on March 16, 1968, Son My village was shelled by U.S. artillery. The preparatory barrage was intended to clear a landing area for Charlie Company's helicopters, but its actual effect was to force those civilians who had begun leaving the area back to My Lai in search of cover. Minutes later, Charlie Company's 1st Platoon, led by Lieut. William Calley, was inserted a short distance to the west of a sub-hamlet known locally as Xom Lang but marked as My Lai (4) on U.S. military maps.

y 7:50 am the remainder of Charlie Company had landed, and Calley led 1st Platoon east through My Lai. Although they encountered no resistance, the soldiers nonetheless killed indiscriminately. Over the next hour, groups of women, children, and elderly men were rounded up and shot at close range. U.S. soldiers also committed numerous rapes. Charlie Company's 2nd Platoon moved north from the landing zone, killing dozens, while 3rd Platoon followed behind, destroying the hamlet's remaining buildings and shooting survivors. At 9:00 am Calley ordered the execution of as many as 150 Vietnamese civilians who had been herded into an irrigation ditch.

Sgt. Ron Haeberle, a U.S. Army photographer attached to Charlie Company, documented the events of the day. He used a black-and-white camera for official Army records but shot in colour on his personal camera. Many of the black-and-white images depicted soldiers questioning prisoners, searching possessions, and burning huts; although the destruction of property violated U.S. military command directives, such actions were typical of a search-and-destroy mission and did not provide direct evidence of war crimes. Haeberle's personal colour photographs, which he did not turn over to the Army, were later published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer and Life magazine. One graphically depicted a trail littered with the bodies of dead women, children, and infants, and another captured a group of terrified women and children moments before they were shot. These photographs served to galvanize the anti-Vietnam War movement and would become some of the most recognizable images of the war.

s the massacre was taking place, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson was flying a scout helicopter at low altitude above My Lai. Observing wounded civilians, he marked their locations with smoke grenades and radioed for troops on the ground to proceed to those positions to administer medical aid. After refueling, Thompson returned to My Lai only to see that the wounded civilians subsequently had been killed. Spotting a squad of U.S. soldiers converging on more than a dozen women and children, Thompson landed his helicopter between the two groups. Thompson's door gunner, Lawrence Colburn, and his crew chief, Glenn Andreotta, manned their weapons as Thompson hailed other helicopters to join him in ferrying the civilians to safety. In 1998 Thompson, Colburn, and Andreotta (posthumously) were awarded the Soldier's Medal for acts of extraordinary bravery not involving contact with the enemy.

By 11:00 am as many as 500 Vietnamese civilians had been killed. Medina ordered Charlie Company to break for lunch and informed his superiors that scores of Viet Cong had been killed in the operation. The sole U.S. casualty had occurred when a soldier shot himself in the foot while trying to clear a jammed weapon.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Weapons of the Vietnam War

From air power to infantry to chemicals, the weapons used in the Vietnam War were more devastating than those of any previous conflict. United States and South Vietnamese forces relied heavily on their superior air power, including B-52 bombers and other aircraft that dropped thousands of pounds of explosives over North Vietnam and Communist targets in South Vietnam. While U.S. troops and their allies used mainly American-manufactured weapons, Communist forces used weapons manufactured in the Soviet Union and China. In addition to artillery and infantry weapons, both sides utilized a variety of tools to further their war aims, including highly toxic chemical defoliants or herbicides (on the U.S. side) and inventive booby traps using sharpened bamboo sticks or crossbows triggered by tripwires (on the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong side).

Vietnam War: Weapons of the Air

The war saw the U.S. Air Force and their South Vietnamese allies fly thousands of massive low-altitude bombing missions over North and South Vietnam as well as over sites of suspected Communist activity in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. The B-52 heavy bomber, developed by Boeing in the late 1940s, helped the U.S. and South Vietnamese dominate the skies, along with smaller, more easily maneuverable fighter planes like the F-4 Phantom. Also widely used was the Bell UH-1 helicopter, dubbed the "Huey," which could fly at low altitudes and speeds and land easily in small spaces. U.S. forces used the Huey to transport troops, supplies and equipment, aid ground troops with additional firepower and evacuated killed or wounded soldiers.

Among the more devastating explosives used in U.S. and South Vietnamese bombing runs was napalm, a chemical compound developed during World War II. When mixed with gasoline and included in incendiary bombs or flamethrowers, napalm could be propelled greater distances than gasoline and released large amounts of carbon monoxide when it exploded, poisoning the air and causing even greater damage than traditional bombs. Though the large-scale U.S. and South Vietnamese aerial bombardment efforts damaged or destroyed much of the land and population of Vietnam, they proved less destructive to the enemy than expected, as North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops fought an irregular style of guerrilla warfare that proved much more resilient than the Americans had hoped.

U.S. and South Vietnamese Artillery & Infantry Weapons

The M-48 tank, with mounted machine guns, could travel up to 30 mph and was used to provide support for U.S. and South Vietnamese troops. Due to Vietnam's soggy jungle terrain, tanks were not used extensively in combat during the Vietnam War. Armored personnel carriers such as the M-113 transported troops and performed reconnaissance and support functions. A common artillery weapon, previously used in World War II, was the 105mm howitzer, which could be towed behind a truck or carried by helicopter and dropped into position. Operated by crews of eight men each, the howitzers fired high-explosive shrapnel shells or "beehive" cartridges (thousands of small, sharp darts) at a rate of three to eight rounds per minute over a range of some 12,500 yards.

One of the most common infantry weapons used by U.S. troops in Vietnam was the M-60 machine gun, which could also be used as an artillery weapon when mounted or operated from a helicopter or tank. The gas-powered M-60 could fire up to 550 bullets in quick succession at a range of almost 2,000 yards, or at short range when fired from the shoulder. One drawback of the M-60 was the heavy weight of its cartridge belts, which limited the ammunition that soldiers could carry. Standard issue for infantrymen in Vietnam was the M-16, a gas-operated, magazine-fed rifle that could fire 5.56 mm-caliber bullets accurately over several hundred yards at 700-900 rounds per minute on its automatic setting; it could also be used as a semi-automatic. Its ammunition came in magazines of 20-30 rounds, making it relatively easy to reload.

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Weapons in Vietnam

Most of the weapons, uniforms and equipment used by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces were manufactured by the Soviet Union and China. The portable, shoulder-fired SA-7 Grail missile was one of many anti-aircraft weapons extensively against American aircraft conducting bombing raids in North Vietnam. On the ground, the DP 7.62mm light machine gun (the equivalent to the U.S.-made M-60) was based on a Soviet design and manufactured in both the Soviet Union and China. The simple but deadly accurate AK-47, known to many as the "peasant's rifle," was shorter and heavier than the M-16, with a lower rate of fire (up to about 600 rounds per minute). It was extraordinarily durable, however, and was able to fire 7.62mm bullets either automatically or semi-automatically from a 30-round clip at a rate of up to about 600 rounds per minute, at a range of up to 435 yards. Another widely used semi-automatic rifle was the SKS carbine or "Chicom."

Other Weapons Used in Vietnam

In addition to rifles and machine guns, U.S. infantry troops were armed with hand grenades (such as the Mark-2), which could be thrown or propelled using rifle-mounted launchers. Mines were used to guard the perimeter around campsites; they could be triggered by trip wires or exploded manually. In terms of chemical weapons, U.S. Air Force planes sprayed more than 19 million gallons of herbicides over 4.5 million acres of land in Vietnam from 1961 to 1972 as part of Operation Ranch Hand, a large-scale defoliation program aimed at eliminating forest cover for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, as well as crops that might be used to feed them. The most commonly used defoliant, a mixture of herbicides containing the toxic dioxin and known as Agent Orange, was later revealed to cause serious health issues–including tumors, birth defects, rashes, psychological symptoms and cancer–among returning U.S. servicemen and their families as well as among large sections of the Vietnamese population.

For their part, North Vietnamese and particularly Viet Cong forces often used explosives captured from U.S. and South Vietnamese forces or cut open unexploded bombs to manufacture their own crude explosives. They also employed booby traps, including hidden bamboo maces or crossbows that could be triggered when soldiers stepped on a tripwire. One particularly common menace was the punji stake trap, a bed of sharpened bamboo stakes that was concealed in a pit for enemy soldiers to stumble across.

In addition to Soviet- or Chinese-supplied arms, Communist forces also carried weapons captured from the French and the Japanese in earlier Indochina wars or used weapons made by hand in Vietnam. Troops in the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) or the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had access to more standard-issue clothing and weapons, while Viet Cong often used improvised weapons and wore peasant clothing to blend in to the South Vietnamese population.
US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

VA Budget Shortfall Action Alert

Recently, VA announced a budget shortfall that may delay the timely delivery of benefits to people nationwide. Veterans, family members, and caregivers have earned VA benefits through service, and we are frustrated to hear certain ones may not be adequately funded through the end of the fiscal year. This is not a problem caused by Congress, but our elected officials in Washington, D.C., have the responsibility to ensure these benefits are paid on time to those who have earned them. Each year VA has been provided with the resources it requested for veterans' care and benefits, and our legislators must ensure that happens this time as well. Congress must pass a supplemental funding bill by Sept. 20 to make sure veterans, survivors, and caregivers receive next months' benefit payments without interruption. Congress must also hold VA accountable to prevent issues like this from happening in the future. However, this accountability can happen AFTER Congress provides supplemental funding, so veterans, survivors, and caregivers do not go without or face financial difficulties due to inadequate government funding.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Do Veterans Benefits Expire?

Some of the common benefits for veterans include health care, education benefits (like the GI Bill), and others related to disability claims and appeals.

However, many veterans aren't aware that many of their benefits can expire.
Although these deadlines are generally firm, the VA does have provisions to waive them if you have a legitimate reason for not applying before the given deadlines. These may include health and disability issues. However, the VA will not waive a time limit for not knowing the deadline for your benefits. Missing these deadlines can impact your access to care and services. Here are some quick examples of common VA benefits and their time limits:

Veteran benefits aren't just a nice perk -- they are something you earned through service in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Space Force, Air Force or Coast Guard. But knowing what your benefits are and how to use them isn't a simple task. Where do you find them? How do you sign up? What are your veteran state benefits? How do you access your benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs? How do you use your VA loan or GI Bill? Use Military.com's veteran benefits resources to learn about all of the benefits of military service provided by a grateful nation.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Deadliest Year for American Soldiers in Vietnam

According to various sources, including the Vietnam War's official records and historical accounts, 1968 was the deadliest year for American soldiers in Vietnam. This year saw a significant escalation in combat operations, particularly during the Tet Offensive, which began on January 30, 1968.

During 1968, the United States suffered a total of 16,899 battle-related deaths, with 11,363 killed in action (KIA) and 5,536 dying from wounds received in combat. This represents a significant increase from the previous year, 1967, when 11,363 American soldiers were killed in action.

The Tet Offensive, launched by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC), caught the U.S. military off guard and resulted in intense fighting across South Vietnam. The U.S. military responded with a series of operations, including the siege of Hue, the Battle of Khe Sanh, and the Battle of Saigon, which further escalated the conflict.

The human cost of the war was staggering, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. The Vietnamese people, including civilians and soldiers, lost an estimated 2 million lives, while the United States suffered over 58,000 combat deaths.

Key Statistics:

• 1968: 16,899 battle-related deaths (11,363 KIA, 5,536 died from wounds)
• Total U.S. combat deaths (1955-1973): 58,220
• Estimated Vietnamese civilian casualties (1955-1975): 2 million
• Estimated Vietnamese military casualties (1955-1975): 1,100,000

US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics

Introduction

The following tables were generated from the Vietnam Conflict Extract Data File of the Defense Casualty Analysis System (DCAS) Extract Files, which is current as of April 29, 2008.

The Vietnam Conflict Extract Data File of the Defense Casualty Analysis System (DCAS) Extract Files contains records of 58,220 U.S. military fatal casualties of the Vietnam War. These records were transferred into the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration in 2008. The earliest casualty record contains a date of death of June 8, 1956, and the most recent casualty record contains a date of death of May 28, 2006. The Defense Casualty Analysis System Extract Files were created by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Go Here.

https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics

US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[EMS]

If you are fighting in a war, going in and thinking its going to be a walk over is the wrong way to be thinking. That was the US in Vietnam. They are not trained in jungle warfare, you would have been better off with Ghurkhas on your side for that one.

When the US helped those in Afghanistan fight the Russians who wanted control of Afghanistan, why didn't the war machine learn from the Russian's mistake because they didn't as they went in there years later.

Early wars were about control over land and religion, later wars have always been able a commodity or drugs (funny that the US made deals with local war lords and in return they could continue sending their drugs to the US, not the first time something like that happened)

 

[whitefish]

As A veteran you should know about this

Congress must fund our military properly

The shenanigans we're seeing play out on Capitol Hill are more than typical political bickering. They are endangering our national security, military readiness, and other core issues for veterans, service members and their families. In short: We're less than two weeks away from a government shutdown as Congress is unable to pass spending legislation before a new fiscal year begins Oct. 1. Our elected representatives are looking at yet another stopgap measure, a continuing resolution (CR) which is akin to placing a bandage on a wounded body part that requires major surgery. There are numerous reasons why passage of a CR would gravely impact America. Among them:

Military readiness and operations: A CR would be disruptive in several ways, compromising military response operations to worldwide threats, reducing readiness training and putting the brakes on maintenance fixes, while simultaneously empowering known enemies.

Delayed pay for troops: Active-duty personnel and reservists could experience delays in receiving hard-earned pay raises, negatively impacting morale and financial stability, especially in the current economic climate. Imagine being a young service member and having to talk with a spouse or partner about which bills to pay, just because Congress is mired in a political standoff.

Border security: Already stretched thin, border protection agencies could face staffing shortages and resource limitations, increasing their vulnerability to illegal activities and security threats.

Recruitment challenges: The armed forces are already faced with challenges when it comes to recruiting the best and the brightest. As the standoff takes its toll, potential recruits' enlistment bonuses could be halted, risking that they forego military service due to financial uncertainty. Additionally, current service members could choose to not re-enlist, creating talent shortages in areas critical to national security.

Those are among the scenarios we will be facing with a CR, instead of a fully funded fiscal year. But there is still time for Congress to do the right thing.

Our members of Congress must push aside their political posturing, focus on completing the mandated task at hand and doing what is right for America, its military members and their families. I am calling on Congress to pass an actual spending bill on time to ensure our military is properly funded throughout this fiscal year.


National Commander
James LaCoursiere Jr.



US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran