Sticky Military and Veterans thread

[Charvelx04]

Feel free to use this thread to talk, share, express or otherwise engage in the military and our veterans.

Keep in mind, topics such as these can contain some serious passion on the subject... so let's not forget, we're adults. Some topics may be touchy or cause anxiety... so let's support the conversation and talking points; taking opinions out on each will not be tolerated here.

C4.

 

[EMS]

I wasn't in the forces but my grand parents were.....hard to believe that my fathers side fought for the British and my mothers father was press ganged into serving in the German army, not that they were German they were from a small homestead on the Polish border. My father was posted to places like Aden and Bahrein during the uprisings...he told me a few stories about those posts, he knew mad mike. For the British Army veterans, most of them had heard of Mad Mike. I support the Ghurkha's as they fought valiantly for the British sovereignty and then were treated like , they finally got what they deserved but after a lot of years of fighting for it.

A lad that I knew from school fought in the Falklands, I don't know anyone that has done Afghanistan the second time nor Iraq, either time.

I also support the RAF veterans for everything they have done.

Neither the British Army nor the RAF wanted me....maybe its because I'm not very good at taking orders from people. Couldn't get in the police force (I tried 3 different forces at 3 different times in my life) I think that might have been the same reason. Who knows, I know I don't....

 

[Edna]

I’m really glad this thread was created—there’s so much to discuss and appreciate when it comes to our military and veterans. One thing that’s been on my mind lately is the transition process for veterans returning to civilian life. I’ve heard from a few friends who served that it can be a tough adjustment, especially when it comes to finding a sense of purpose after leaving the military.

My brother went through this a few years ago, and what really helped him was connecting with other veterans. He joined a local veterans' group, which made a big difference for him. They shared resources, gave each other advice, and supported one another through the transition. It was a lifeline for him, both professionally and emotionally.

However, I also want to acknowledge that the transition isn’t always straightforward and that some veterans face lingering issues related to their service. My brother, like many others, had to confront some difficult experiences from his time in the military. He faced the challenges of PTSD, including flashbacks and anxiety, which made adjusting to civilian life quite tough. Connecting with other veterans and seeking professional help were critical in managing these symptoms.

The shift from the structured military environment to the less regimented civilian world was jarring for him. He struggled with adapting to a new daily routine and the different expectations in civilian life. Processing the trauma of witnessing combat and the loss of fellow soldiers was another significant hurdle. Discussing these experiences with peers who understood his situation was crucial for his emotional healing.

Translating his military skills into a civilian resume and navigating the job market proved challenging as well. Veteran employment programs and support networks were instrumental in finding new career opportunities. Finally, the loss of a clear sense of identity and purpose after leaving the military was a profound struggle. Finding new directions and redefining his sense of self was an important part of his transition.

I’ve been thinking about how these issues might also relate to members of the Kenya Defense Forces and

as well. I imagine that transitioning from such a disciplined and high-stakes environment to civilian life could present similar challenges.

 

[uncledude]

my grandson signed up for the Army. he has been in basic training for 3 weeks now.
he wants to be a mechanic ... in the rear with the gear...

so far he said he is loving it. he was so happy when he found out he would be shooting for a whole week
he's been going to the range with me since he was a little guy

the first pic he sent us is his shaved head...so funny

 

[whitefish]

Fish - US ARMY Veteran

Drafted US Army
SSID Number: 491xxxxxx42

Current Status

US/AUS Veteran Residing in CA, United States

VFW Post 6309,Gilroy, CA
Service Officer and Trustee - Scouts / Youth Programs District 12 Chairman

The American Legion Post 318 San Jose , CA
Life Time Member

US Army 1969 - 1972

Induction Fort Louis Missouri
Fort Bragg North Carolina 82nd Airborne - Basic
Fort Benning Georgia - 82nd Airborne Jump School
Fort Knox Kentucky - AIT Field Artillery, Self Propelled Tank Training School
Fort Sill Oklahoma - Overseas Deployment
Oakland Army Base California Departure - Viet-Nam

ETS Fort Lewis Washington / Sydney NSW Australia

MOS - 13R20 Armor Crewman
Rank - SPC 5

Divisions
4th Infantry Division Artillery
196th Infantry Brigade
Combat Veteran

Deployed & Served in Viet-Nam / Cambodia - Fire Base 229 on the DMZ

Now suffering from PTSD and Agent Orange Contamination

I am 100% Disabled Veteran ( Total & Permanent ) rated by the VA

 

[Wombat]

6 years Royal Australian Army.
After completing basic training and corp training I spent all my years in the 2nd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment.
Spent 12 months in Vietnam from May 1970 to Jun 1971.
Upon discharge I was employed in a Security Company doing carry on hand luggage searches at the local Airport. After 2 months in that role I landed a job as an Airport Security Officer at the same Airport. From there i went on to become an Airport Safety Officer, all up I did 25 yrs before being put off work as Totally and Permanently Incapacitated (TPI).
Been retired since 12/23/1999.

 

[whitefish]

Wombat, thank you fore your service ...

You were in country about the same time I was there - my Base Camp was De Nang up north but I did come across quite a few Aussies in De Nang when I came off the hill fore 3 day R&R - we were all in the killing fields ....

fish

 

[whitefish]

Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange win $180 million settlement

On May 7, 1984, seven chemical companies, including Dow and Monsanto, agree to pay $180 million to thousands of Vietnam veterans exposed to the chemical herbicide Agent Orange during the war. Lawyers for the two sides announced the surprise out-of-court settlement on the day jury selection was to begin in the case.

U.S. military forces sprayed nearly 20 million gallons of herbicides over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from 1961 to 1971 during Operation Ranch Hand, with the aim of destroying forest cover and crops being used by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops. The chemical Agent Orange made up nearly two-thirds of the herbicides used.

Although its active ingredients caused plants to lose their foliage, Agent Orange also included significant amounts of dioxin, a “persistent organic pollutant” which could persist for years in the environment through soil, lake and river sediments, and in the food chain. Dioxin contaminants are linked to long-term health issues including type 2 diabetes, immune system dysfunction, nerve disorders, muscular dysfunction, hormone disruption and heart disease—with even more dire effects for developing fetuses. After the war, returning Vietnam veterans and their families began reporting these issues.

A class-action lawsuit was filed in 1979 on behalf of 2.4 million veterans exposed to Agent Orange, culminating in a surprise settlement five years later, with the seven large chemical companies that manufactured the herbicide agreeing to pay $180 million in compensation to the veterans or their children. Lawyers representing the veterans, in turn, dropped damage claims against these defendant companies.

The manufacturers had maintained the “government contractor” defense—that because they had been following government orders to produce Agent Orange, the government should be held liable. A few months after the settlement, the Justice Department refuted that claim, pinning the blame on the manufacturers’ “profit, not compulsion or patriotism.” In 1991, President George H.W. Bush signed into law the Agent Orange Act of 1991, mandating that diseases associated with Agent Orange and other herbicides be treated as the result of wartime service, acknowledging responsibility on the part of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.

However, none of the above bills or settlements sought to protect or compensate the Vietnamese victims of Operation Ranch Hand. According to the Vietnamese government, as many as 400,000 Vietnamese people suffered death or permanent injury, while another 2 million may have suffered from illnesses brought on by Agent Orange. A class-action lawsuit brought by Vietnamese citizens in 2004 against more than 30 chemical companies claimed that the use of Agent Orange constituted a violation of international law, but that suit was rejected on final appeal in 2008 by the same U.S. District Judge who presided over the U.S. veterans’ lawsuit.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[Charvelx04]

In May of '84... just before freshman year, high school... I was fortunate enough to sign up with the Civil Air Patrol. They were stationed at Davis Monthan AFB (Air Force Base) in Tucson AZ. Was in it for a few months, getting in some training and first step military knowledge. Was having fun with it, truly did. Got to be on base doing drills, marches, routines and exercises.

But... that's where it ended for me, unfortunately. I went to the recruiters office for the AF, talking about all the requirements it would take to get into the service, much less get to be an actual fighter pilot. What took me out, having asthma. Well, their rules at the time was no record of said disease after age 11. Hell, I still had my inhalor at home. So... after finding out no branch would take me in, it kinda shifted the entire direction my life would have taken.

So.. for all of you that have served, thank you. Thank you for everything you've ever done.. and know this, not only do you have our full support... there were some of us that really did want to be right beside you.

 

[whitefish]

Vietnam War,

(1954–75), a protracted conflict that pitted the communist government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Cong, against the government of South Vietnam and its principal ally, the United States. Called the “American War” in Vietnam (or, in full, the “War Against the Americans to Save the Nation”), the war was also part of a larger regional conflict (see Indochina wars) and a manifestation of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies.


Viet Nam War A map showing bases and supply routes during the Vietnam War.

At the heart of the conflict was the desire of North Vietnam, which had defeated the French colonial administration of Vietnam in 1954, to unify the entire country under a single communist regime modeled after those of the Soviet Union and China. The South Vietnamese government, on the other hand, fought to preserve a Vietnam more closely aligned with the West. U.S. military advisers, present in small numbers throughout the 1950s, were introduced on a large scale beginning in 1961, and active combat units were introduced in 1965. By 1969 more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and China poured weapons, supplies, and advisers into the North, which in turn provided support, political direction, and regular combat troops for the campaign in the South. The costs and casualties of the growing war proved too much for the United States to bear, and U.S. combat units were withdrawn by 1973. In 1975 South Vietnam fell to a full-scale invasion by the North.

The human costs of the long conflict were harsh for all involved. Not until 1995 did Vietnam release its official estimate of war dead: as many as 2 million civilians on both sides and some 1.1 million North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters. The U.S. military has estimated that between 200,000 and 250,000 South Vietnamese soldiers died in the war. In 1982 the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was dedicated in Washington, D.C., inscribed with the names of 57,939 members of U.S. armed forces who had died or were missing as a result of the war. Over the following years, additions to the list have brought the total past 58,200. (At least 100 names on the memorial are those of servicemen who were actually Canadian citizens.) Among other countries that fought for South Vietnam on a smaller scale, South Korea suffered more than 4,000 dead, Thailand about 350, Australia more than 500, and New Zealand some three dozen.


Vietnamese boat people. Vietnamese refugees waiting to be taken aboard the USS Blue Ridge during a rescue operation 350 miles (563 km) northeast of Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 1984.

Vietnam emerged from the war as a potent military power within Southeast Asia, but its agriculture, business, and industry were disrupted, large parts of its countryside were scarred by bombs and defoliation and laced with land mines, and its cities and towns were heavily damaged. A mass exodus in 1975 of people loyal to the South Vietnamese cause was followed by another wave in 1978 of “boat people,” refugees fleeing the economic restructuring imposed by the communist regime. Meanwhile, the United States, its military demoralized and its civilian electorate deeply divided, began a process of coming to terms with defeat in what had been its longest and most controversial war. The two countries finally resumed formal diplomatic relations in 1995.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

French rule ended, Vietnam divided​

Vietnam (1954–76)

The Vietnam War had its origins in the broader Indochina wars of the 1940s and ’50s, when nationalist groups such as Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh, inspired by Chinese and Soviet communism, fought the colonial rule first of Japan and then of France. The French Indochina War broke out in 1946 and went on for eight years, with France’s war effort largely funded and supplied by the United States. Finally, with their shattering defeat by the Viet Minh at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the French came to the end of their rule in Indochina. The battle prodded negotiators at the Geneva Conference to produce the final Geneva Accords in July 1954. The accords established the 17th parallel (latitude 17° N) as a temporary demarcation line separating the military forces of the French and the Viet Minh. North of the line was the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam, which had waged a successful eight-year struggle against the French. The North was under the full control of the Worker’s Party, or Vietnamese Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh; its capital was Hanoi. In the South the French transferred most of their authority to the State of Vietnam, which had its capital at Saigon and was nominally under the authority of the former Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai. Within 300 days of the signing of the accords, a demilitarized zone, or DMZ, was to be created by mutual withdrawal of forces north and south of the 17th parallel, and the transfer of any civilians who wished to leave either side was to be completed. Nationwide elections to decide the future of Vietnam, North and South, were to be held in 1956.


Ngo Dinh Diem

Accepting the de facto partition of Vietnam as unavoidable but still pledging to halt the spread of communism in Asia, U.S. Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower began a crash program of assistance to the State of Vietnam—or South Vietnam, as it was invariably called. The Saigon Military Mission, a covert operation to conduct psychological warfare and paramilitary activities in South Vietnam, was launched on June 1, 1954, under the command of U.S. Air Force Col. Edward Lansdale. At the same time, Viet Minh leaders, confidently expecting political disarray and unrest in the South, retained many of their political operatives and propagandists below the 17th parallel even as they withdrew their military forces to the North. Ngo Dinh Diem, the newly installed premier of South Vietnam, thus faced opposition not only from the communist regime in the North but also from the Viet Minh’s stay-behind political agents, armed religious sects in the South, and even subversive elements in his own army.

Yet Diem had the full support of U.S. military advisers, who trained and reequipped his army along American lines and foiled coup plots by dissident officers. Operatives of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) bought off or intimidated Diem’s domestic opposition, and U.S. aid agencies helped him to keep his economy afloat and to resettle some 900,000 refugees who had fled the communist North.

By late 1955 Diem had consolidated his power in the South, defeating the remaining sect forces and arresting communist operatives who had surfaced in considerable numbers to prepare for the anticipated elections. Publicly opposed to the elections, Diem called for a referendum only in the South, and in October 1955 he declared himself president of the Republic of Vietnam. The North, not ready to start a new war and unable to induce its Chinese or Russian allies to act, could do little.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The Diem regime and the Viet Cong​

Leaders in the U.S. capital, Washington, D.C., were surprised and delighted by Diem’s success. American military and economic aid continued to pour into South Vietnam while American military and police advisers helped train and equip Diem’s army and security forces. Beneath the outward success of the Diem regime, however, lay fatal problems. Diem was a poor administrator who refused to delegate authority, and he was pathologically suspicious of anyone who was not a member of his family. His brother and close confidant, Ngo Dinh Nhu, controlled an extensive system of extortion, payoffs, and influence peddling through a secret network called the Can Lao, which had clandestine members in all government bureaus and military units as well as schools, newspapers, and businesses. In the countryside, ambitious programs of social and economic reform had been allowed to languish while many local officials and police engaged in extortion, bribery, and theft of government property. That many of these officials were, like Diem himself, northerners and Roman Catholics further alienated them from the local people.



Watch the Viet Cong's guerrilla communist forces move down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and CambodiaAfter South Vietnamese Premier Ngo Dinh Diem canceled reunification elections scheduled for 1956, the communist Viet Minh decided on war.

Diem’s unexpected offensive against communist political organizers and propagandists in the countryside in 1955 had resulted in the arrest of thousands and in the temporary disorganization of the communists’ infrastructure. By 1957, however, the communists, now called the Viet Cong (VC), had begun a program of terrorism and assassination against government officials and functionaries. The Viet Cong’s ranks were soon swelled by many noncommunist Vietnamese who had been alienated by the corruption and intimidation of local officials.

Beginning in the spring of 1959, armed bands of Viet Cong were occasionally engaging units of the South Vietnamese army in regular firefights. By that time the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, meeting in Hanoi, had endorsed a resolution calling for the use of armed force to overthrow the Diem government. Southerners specially trained in the North as insurgents were infiltrated back into the South along with arms and equipment. A new war had begun.


Viet Cong. A Viet Cong soldier crouching in a bunker during the Vietnam War.

Despite its American training and weapons, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, usually called the ARVN, was in many ways ill-adapted to meet the insurgency of the Viet Cong. Higher-ranking officers, appointed on the basis of their family connections and political reliability, were often apathetic, incompetent, or corrupt—and sometimes all three. The higher ranks of the army were also thoroughly penetrated by Viet Cong agents, who held positions varying from drivers, clerks, and radio operators to senior headquarters officers. With its heavy American-style equipment, the ARVN was principally a road-bound force not well configured to pursuing VC units in swamps or jungles. U.S. military advisers responsible for helping to develop and improve the force usually lacked knowledge of the Vietnamese language, and in any case they routinely spent less than 12 months in the country.

At the end of 1960 the communists in the South announced the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF), which was designed to serve as the political arm of the Viet Cong and also as a broad-based organization for all those who desired an end to the Diem regime. The Front’s regular army, usually referred to as the “main force” by the Americans, was much smaller than Diem’s army, but it was only one component of the Viet Cong’s so-called People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF). At the base of the PLAF were village guerrilla units, made up of part-time combatants who lived at home and worked at their regular occupations during the day. Their function was to persuade or intimidate their neighbours into supporting the NLF, to protect its political apparatus, and to harass the government, police, and security forces with booby traps, raids, kidnappings, and murders.

The guerrilla forces also served as a recruiting agency and source of manpower for the other echelons of the PLAF. Above the guerrillas were the local or regional forces, full-time soldiers organized in platoon- or company-sized units who operated within the bounds of a province or region. As members of the guerrilla militia gained experience, they might be upgraded to the regional or main forces. These forces were better-equipped and acted as full-time soldiers. Based in remote jungles, swamps, or mountainous areas, they could operate throughout a province (in the case of regional forces) or even the country (in the case of the main force). When necessary, the full-time forces might also reinforce a guerrilla unit or several units for some special operation.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The U.S. role grows​

By the middle of 1960 it was apparent that the South Vietnamese army and security forces could not cope with the new threat. During the last half of 1959, VC-initiated ambushes and attacks on posts averaged well over 100 a month. In the next year 2,500 government functionaries and other real and imagined enemies of the Viet Cong were assassinated. It took some time for the new situation to be recognized in Saigon and Washington. Only after four VC companies had attacked and overrun an ARVN regimental headquarters northeast of Saigon in January 1960 did Americans in Vietnam begin to plan for increased U.S. aid to Diem. They also began to search for ways to persuade Diem to reform and reorganize his government—a search that would prove futile.


Track the rapid escalation of the Vietnam War under Pres. John F. Kennedy's administrationUnder U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy, the number of U.S. advisers to the South Vietnamese military rose from 1,500 to 15,000. From Vietnam

To the new administration of U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy, who took office in 1961, Vietnam represented both a challenge and an opportunity. The Viet Cong’s armed struggle against Diem seemed to be a prime example of the new Chinese and Soviet strategy of encouraging and aiding “wars of national liberation” in newly independent nations of Asia and Africa—in other words, helping communist-led insurgencies to subvert and overthrow the shaky new governments of emerging nations. Kennedy and some of his close advisers believed that Vietnam presented an opportunity to test the United States’ ability to conduct a “counterinsurgency” against communist subversion and guerrilla warfare. Kennedy accepted without serious question the so-called domino theory, which held that the fates of all Southeast Asian countries were closely linked and that a communist success in one must necessarily lead to the fatal weakening of the others. A successful effort in Vietnam—in Kennedy’s words, “the cornerstone of the free world in Southeast Asia”—would provide to both allies and adversaries evidence of U.S. determination to meet the challenge of communist expansion in the Third World.


Kennedy, John F.: presidential address on the Pathet LaoU.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy addressing the press about communist military action in Laos, March 23, 1961

Though never doubting Vietnam’s importance, the new president was obliged, during much of his first year in office, to deal with far more pressing issues—the construction of the Berlin Wall, conflicts between the Laotian government and the communist-led Pathet Lao, and the humiliating failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Because of these other, more widely known crises, it seemed to some of Kennedy’s advisers all the more important to score some sort of success in Vietnam. Success seemed urgently needed as membership in the NLF continued to climb, military setbacks to the ARVN continued, and the rate of infiltration from the North increased.

U.S. intelligence estimated that in 1960 about 4,000 communist cadres infiltrated from the North; by 1962 the total had risen to some 12,900. Most of these men were natives of South Vietnam who had been regrouped to the North after Geneva. More than half were Communist Party members. Hardened and experienced leaders, they provided a framework around which the PLAF could be organized. To arm and equip their growing forces in the South, Hanoi leaders sent crew-served weapons and ammunition in steel-hulled motor junks down the coast of Vietnam and also through Laos via a network of tracks known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Most of the firearms for PLAF soldiers actually came from the United States: large quantities of American rifles, carbines, machine guns, and mortars were captured from Saigon’s armed forces or simply sold to the Viet Cong by Diem’s corrupt officers and functionaries.

Many of the South’s problems could be attributed to the continuing incompetence, rigidity, and corruption of the Diem regime, but the South Vietnamese president had few American critics in Saigon or Washington. Instead, the U.S. administration made great efforts to reassure Diem of its support, dispatching Vice Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson to Saigon in May 1961 and boosting economic and military aid.


Montagnards in the Vietnam WarU.S. adviser training Montagnards (indigenous central highlanders) at a fortified camp near Buon Me Thuot in central Vietnam, July 1962.

As the situation continued to deteriorate, Kennedy sent two key advisers, economist Walt W. Rostow and former army chief of staff Maxwell Taylor, to Vietnam in the fall of 1961 to assess conditions. The two concluded that the South Vietnamese government was losing the war with the Viet Cong and had neither the will nor the ability to turn the tide on its own. They recommended a greatly expanded program of military assistance, including such items as helicopters and armoured personnel carriers, and an ambitious plan to place American advisers and technical experts at all levels and in all agencies of the Vietnamese government and military. They also recommended the introduction of a limited number of U.S. combat troops, a measure the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been urging as well.

Well aware of the domestic political consequences of “losing” another country to the communists, Kennedy could see no viable exit from Vietnam, but he also was reluctant to commit combat troops to a war in Southeast Asia. Instead, the administration proceeded with vigour and enthusiasm to carry out the expansive program of aid and guidance proposed in the Rostow-Taylor report. A new four-star general’s position—commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV)—was established in Saigon to guide the military assistance effort. The number of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam, less than 800 throughout the 1950s, rose to about 9,000 by the middle of 1962.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The conflict deepens​

Buoyed by its new American weapons and encouraged by its aggressive and confident American advisers, the South Vietnamese army took the offensive against the Viet Cong. At the same time, the Diem government undertook an extensive security campaign called the Strategic Hamlet Program. The object of the program was to concentrate rural populations into more defensible positions where they could be more easily protected and segregated from the Viet Cong. The hamlet project was inspired by a similar program in Malaya, where local farmers had been moved into so-called New Villages during a rebellion by Chinese Malayan communists in 1948–60. In the case of Vietnam, however, it proved virtually impossible to tell which Vietnamese were to be protected and which excluded. Because of popular discontent with the compulsory labour and frequent dislocations involved in establishing the villages, many strategic hamlets soon had as many VC recruits inside their walls as outside.


Examine the state of the U.S.-backed and Diem-led South Vietnamese army against the communist Viet CongThe Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), though well-equipped and trained by U.S. advisers, was poorly motivated and poorly led in its fight against the Viet Cong.

Meanwhile, the Viet Cong learned to cope with the ARVN’s new array of American weapons. Helicopters proved vulnerable to small-arms fire, while armoured personnel carriers could be stopped or disoriented if their exposed drivers or machine gunners were hit. The communists’ survival of many military encounters was helped by the fact that the leadership of the South Vietnamese army was as incompetent, faction-ridden, and poorly trained as it had been in the 1950s. In January 1963 a Viet Cong battalion near the village of Ap Bac in the Mekong delta, south of Saigon, though surrounded and outnumbered by ARVN forces, successfully fought its way out of its encirclement, destroying five helicopters and killing about 80 South Vietnamese soldiers and three American advisers. By now some aggressive American newsmen were beginning to report on serious deficiencies in the U.S. advisory and support programs in Vietnam (see Sidebar: The Vietnam War and the Media), and some advisers at lower levels were beginning to agree with them, but there was also a large and powerful bureaucracy in Saigon that had a deep stake in ensuring that U.S. programs appeared successful. The USMACV commander Paul Harkins and U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting in particular continued to assure Washington that all was going well.


Self-immolation of Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc in protest during the Vietnam WarBuddhist monk Thich Quang Duc, doused in gasoline, burning himself to death to protest the policies of Vietnamese Pres. Ngo Dinh Diem, Saigon, Vietnam, June 11, 1963.

By the summer of 1963, however, there were growing doubts about the ability of the Diem government to prosecute the war. The behaviour of the Ngo family, always odd, had now become bizarre. Diem’s brother Nhu was known to smoke opium daily and was suspected by U.S. intelligence of secretly negotiating with the North. Nhu’s wife, known to the world as Madame Nhu, wielded enormous influence, which she used to promote Roman Catholic social causes and ridicule the country’s Buddhist majority. In May 1963 the Ngos became embroiled in a fatal quarrel with the Buddhist leadership. Strikes and demonstrations by Buddhists in Saigon and Hue were met with violence by the army and Nhu’s security forces and resulted in numerous arrests. The following month a Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Duc, publicly doused himself with gasoline and set himself ablaze as a protest against Diem’s repression. Sensational photographs of that event were on the front pages of major American newspapers the following morning.

Learn about the U.S. government's prior knowledge of the military coup against and assassination of Ngo Dinh DiemOn November 1, 1963, South Vietnamese Pres. Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and killed in a coup mounted by his own military with the prior knowledge of the U.S. government.

By now many students and members of the professional classes in South Vietnamese cities had joined the Buddhists. After a series of brutal raids by government forces on Buddhist pagodas in August, a group of South Vietnamese generals secretly approached the U.S. government to determine how Washington might react to a coup to remove Diem. The U.S. reply was far from discouraging, but it was not until November, after further deterioration in Diem’s relations with Washington, that the generals felt ready to move. On November 1, ARVN units seized control of Saigon, disarmed Nhu’s security forces, and occupied the presidential palace. The American attitude was officially neutral, but the U.S. embassy maintained contact with the dissident generals while making no move to aid the Ngos, who were captured and murdered by the army.


William Westmoreland; Lyndon B. JohnsonWilliam Westmoreland meeting with U.S. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson in the White House, Washington, D.C., 1968.

Diem’s death was followed by Kennedy’s less than three weeks later. With respect to Vietnam, the assassinated president left his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, a legacy of indecision, half-measures, and gradually increasing involvement. Kennedy had relished Cold War challenges; Johnson did not. A veteran politician and one of the ablest men ever to serve in the U.S. Senate, he had an ambitious domestic legislative agenda that he was determined to fight through Congress. Foreign policy crises would be at best a distraction and at worst a threat to his domestic reforms. Yet Johnson, like Kennedy, was also well aware of the high political costs of “losing” another country to communism. He shared the view of most of his advisers, many of them holdovers from the Kennedy administration, that Vietnam was also a key test of U.S. credibility and ability to keep its commitments to its allies. Consequently, Johnson was determined to do everything necessary to carry on the American commitment to South Vietnam. He replaced Harkins with Gen. William Westmoreland, a former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and increased the number of U.S. military personnel still further—from 16,000 at the time of Kennedy’s death in November 1963 to 23,000 by the end of 1964.

US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The Gulf of Tonkin​

While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. Those who had expected that the removal of the unpopular Ngos would lead to unity and a more vigorous prosecution of the war were swiftly disillusioned. A short-lived military junta was followed by a shaky dictatorship under Gen. Nguyen Khanh in January 1964.

In Hanoi, communist leaders, believing that victory was near, decided to make a major military commitment to winning the South. Troops and then entire units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were sent south through Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which was by that time becoming a network of modern roads capable of handling truck traffic. Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong strongly supported the North Vietnamese offensive and promised to supply weapons and technical and logistical personnel. The Soviets, though now openly hostile to China, also decided to send aid to the North.

With the South Vietnamese government in disarray, striking a blow against the North seemed to the Americans to be the only option. U.S. advisers were already working with the South Vietnamese to carry out small maritime raids and parachute drops of agents, saboteurs, and commandos into North Vietnam. These achieved mixed success and in any case were too feeble to have any real impact. By the summer of 1964 the Pentagon had developed a plan for air strikes against selected targets in North Vietnam designed to inflict pain on the North and perhaps retard its support of the war in the South. To make clear the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, some of Johnson’s advisers urged him to seek a congressional resolution granting him broad authority to take action to safeguard U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. Johnson, however, preferred to shelve the controversial issue of Vietnam until after the November election.


Analyze the effects of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed under the Lyndon Johnson administration during the Vietnam WarIn August 1964, in response to an alleged attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the U.S. Congress authorized Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson to take any action necessary to deal with threats against U.S. forces and allies in Southeast Asia.

An unexpected development in August 1964 altered that timetable. On August 2 the destroyer USS Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats while on electronic surveillance patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. The preceding day, patrol boats of the South Vietnamese navy had carried out clandestine raids on the islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu just off the coast of North Vietnam, and the North Vietnamese may have assumed that the Maddox was involved. In any case, the U.S. destroyer suffered no damage, and the North Vietnamese boats were driven off by gunfire from the Maddox and from aircraft based on a nearby carrier.

President Johnson reacted to news of the attack by announcing that the U.S. Navy would continue patrols in the gulf and by sending a second destroyer, the Turner Joy, to join the Maddox. On the night of August 4 the two ships reported a second attack by torpedo boats. Although the captain of the Maddox soon cautioned that evidence for the second incident was inconclusive, Johnson and his advisers chose to believe those who insisted that a second attack had indeed taken place. The president ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases, and he requested congressional support for a broad resolution authorizing him to take whatever action he deemed necessary to deal with future threats to U.S. forces or U.S. allies in Southeast Asia.

The measure, soon dubbed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed the Senate and House overwhelmingly on August 7. Few who voted for the resolution were aware of the doubts concerning the second attack, and even fewer knew of the connection between the North Vietnamese attacks and U.S.-sponsored raids in the North or that the Maddox was on an intelligence mission. Although what many came to see as Johnson’s deceptions would cause problems later, the immediate result of the president’s actions was to remove Vietnam as an issue from the election campaign. In November Johnson was reelected by a landslide.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The United States enters the war​

Between the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the U.S. presidential election in November 1964, the situation in Vietnam had changed for the worse. Beginning in September, the Khanh government was succeeded by a bewildering array of cliques and coalitions, some of which stayed in power less than a month. In the countryside even the best ARVN units seemed incapable of defeating the main forces of the Viet Cong. The communists were now deliberately targeting U.S. military personnel and bases, beginning with a mortar attack on the U.S. air base at Bien Hoa near Saigon in November.


See how the Viet Cong's successful guerrilla warfare pushed Lyndon Johnson toward the path of total warBy the summer of 1964, the successes of the Viet Cong on the battlefield led the U.S. government to conclude that only massive military intervention could save South Vietnam.

Many of Johnson’s advisers now began to argue for some sort of retaliation against the North. Air attacks against North Vietnam, they argued, would boost the morale of the shaky South Vietnamese and reassure them of continuing American commitment. They would also make Hanoi “pay a price” for its war against Saigon, and they might actually reduce the ability of the North to supply men and matériel for the military effort in the South. Except for Undersecretary of State George Ball, all the president’s civilian aides and principal military advisers believed in the efficacy of a bombing campaign; they differed only as to how it should be conducted.

The military favoured a short and sharp campaign intended to cripple the North’s war-making capabilities. On the other hand, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton argued for a series of graduated air attacks that would become progressively more damaging until the North Vietnamese decided that the cost of waging war in the South was too high. Within the administration, both Ball and Vice Pres. Hubert H. Humphrey warned the president that a major bombing campaign would likely lead only to further American commitment and political problems at home. But Johnson was more concerned with the immediate need to take action in order to halt the slide in Saigon. In mid-February, without public announcement, the United States began a campaign of sustained air strikes against the North that were code-named Rolling Thunder.


Witness U.S. marines land at Da Nang and North Vietnamese troops infiltrate South Vietnam from LaosIn March 1965 U.S. Marines landed at Da Nang, South Vietnam, and regular troops of the North Vietnamese Army continued to infiltrate into the South.

The bombing campaign followed the graduated path outlined by Bundy but was steadily expanded to include more targets and more frequent attacks. It was closely directed from the White House in order to avoid provoking the Chinese or Soviets through such actions as attacking ports where Soviet ships might be docked or hitting targets near the Chinese border. Yet it was soon apparent that the bombing would have little direct impact on the struggle in South Vietnam, where the communists appeared to be gaining ground inexorably. By mid-March Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were advising the White House that the United States would have to commit its own troops for combat if it wished to forestall a communist victory. Unhappy memories of the Korean War, where U.S. troops had been bogged down in costly indecisive fighting for three years, had made Johnson and his predecessors reluctant to send soldiers to fight in Asia, but the choice now confronting the president appeared to be between committing troops or enduring outright defeat.


U.S. Marines; Da Nang Air BaseU.S. Marines wading ashore near Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam, 1965.

By June 1965 Westmoreland was predicting the likely collapse of the South Vietnamese army, and he recommended the rapid dispatch of U.S. troops to undertake offensive missions against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese anywhere in South Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, on a mission to Vietnam in early July, confirmed the need for additional forces. In late July Johnson took the final steps that would commit the United States to full-scale war in Vietnam: he authorized the dispatch of 100,000 troops immediately and an additional 100,000 in 1966. The president publicly announced his decisions at a news conference at the end of July. There was no declaration of war—not even an address to Congress—and no attempt to put the country on a war footing economically. The National Guard and military reserves were not called to active service, even though such a measure had long been part of the military’s mobilization plans.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Firepower comes to naught​

Vietnam War, 1965A South Vietnamese farmer passing a U.S. Marine on patrol, 1965.

Although Johnson and his advisers had painstakingly examined the question of committing military forces to Vietnam—how many should be sent and when—they had given little thought to the question of what the troops might do once they arrived. In contrast to the tightly controlled air war in the North, conduct of the ground war in the South was largely left to the leadership of General Westmoreland. Westmoreland commanded all U.S. operations in the South, but he was reluctant to press for a unified U.S. and South Vietnamese command despite the questionable capabilities of many South Vietnamese generals. Instead, the two allies depended on “coordination” and a continuation of the existing advisory relationship, with every South Vietnamese army unit larger than a company having its complement of U.S. advisers. At the top of the hierarchy, Westmoreland himself served as senior adviser to the chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, Gen. Cao Van Vien. The chronic political instability in Saigon seemed finally to have abated with the installation in February 1965 of a government headed by the army general Nguyen Van Thieu as head of state and air force general Nguyen Cao Ky as prime minister. This arrangement, backed by most of the top military commanders, lasted until 1968, when Ky was eased out of power, leaving Thieu in sole control.


Johnson, Lyndon B.U.S. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson watching a helicopter flight exercise at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, July 23, 1966.

Whatever the status of the South Vietnamese forces, they were clearly relegated to a secondary role as U.S. troops and equipment poured into the country. To support these forces, the Americans constructed an enormous logistical infrastructure that included four new jet-capable air bases with 10,000-foot (3,000-metre) runways, six new deepwater ports, 75 tactical air bases, 26 hospitals, and more than 10,000,000 square feet (900,000 square metres) of warehousing. By the fall of 1965, U.S. Marines and soldiers had clashed with NVA and VC main-force troops in bloody battles on Cape Ba Lang An (also called the Batangan Peninsula), southeast of Da Nang, and in the Ia Drang valley in the central highlands. The U.S. forces employed their full panoply of firepower, including air strikes, artillery, armed helicopters, and even B-52 bombers, to inflict enormous losses on the enemy. Yet the communists believed they had more than held their own in these battles, and they were encouraged by the fact that they could easily reoccupy any areas they might have lost once the Americans pulled out.


U.S. marines; Vietnam WarU.S. marines wading through a marsh during the Vietnam War, November 1965.

Westmoreland’s basic assumption was that U.S. forces, with their enormous and superior firepower, could best be employed in fighting the enemy’s strongest units in the jungles and mountains, away from heavily populated areas. Behind this “shield” provided by the Americans, the South Vietnamese army and security forces could take on local Viet Cong elements and proceed with the job of reasserting government control in the countryside. Meanwhile, the regular forces of the Viet Cong and the NVA would continue to suffer enormous casualties at the hands of massive U.S. firepower. Eventually, went the argument, the communists would reach the point where they would no longer be able to replace their losses on the battlefield. Having been ground down on the battlefield, they would presumably agree to a favourable peace settlement.


Search-and-destroy patrol in the Vietnam War, Phuoc Tuy province, South VietnamU.S. soldiers on a search-and-destroy patrol in Phuoc Tuy province, South Vietnam, June 1966.

That point seemed very distant to most Americans as the war continued into 1966 and 1967. Washington declared that the war was being won, but American casualties continued to mount, and much of what the public could see of the war on television appeared confusing if not futile. Because Westmoreland’s strategy was based on attrition, one of the ways to measure progress was to track the number of enemy killed. The resultant “body count,” which was supposed to be carried out by troops during or immediately after combat, soon became notorious for inaccuracy and for the tendency of U.S. commanders to exaggerate the figures. A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN), a study commissioned by U.S. Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson and published in 1966, raised serious questions about Westmoreland’s approach. It proposed that U.S. efforts should be concentrated on providing security and stability for the rural population in South Vietnam and suggested that attrition would not work as an effective counterinsurgency strategy. At the time of its publication, PROVN was largely dismissed by military commanders, and the continued emphasis on overwhelming firepower and “search-and-destroy” missions amounted to an almost wholesale rejection of its recommendations.


U.S. wartime use of defoliant in VietnamU.S. helicopter spraying defoliant in dense jungle during the Vietnam War, 1969.

In the provinces just north and east of Saigon, some large-scale operations such as Cedar Falls and Junction City, involving up to a thousand U.S. troops supported by hundreds of sorties by helicopters and fighter-bombers, were mounted to destroy communist base areas and supplies. Though yielding large quantities of captured weapons and supplies, they were ultimately indecisive, because the U.S. forces would invariably withdraw when they had completed their sweeps and in due course the Viet Cong and NVA would return. In order to deny the NVA and Viet Cong the use of dense forest to conceal their movements and to hide their supply lines and bases, the U.S. Air Force sprayed millions of gallons of a herbicide called Agent Orange along the Vietnamese border with Laos and Cambodia, in areas northwest of Saigon, and along major waterways. Agent Orange was effective in killing vegetation—but only at the price of causing considerable ecological damage to Vietnam and of exposing thousands of people to potentially toxic chemicals that would later cause serious and sometimes fatal health problems.

Along the DMZ separating North and South Vietnam, the Americans established a string of fortified bases extending from just north of Quang Tri on the South China Sea westward to the Laotian border. These bases were part of a system that also included electronic warning devices, minefields, and infrared detectors designed to check infiltration or outright invasion from the North. The North Vietnamese, pleased to find that the strong-point obstacle system was within range of their artillery, carried out periodic attacks by fire and ground forces against U.S. outposts at Con Thien, Gio Linh, Camp Carroll, and Khe Sanh.


Examine the failure of U.S. Gen. William Westmoreland's strategy against the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfareThe search-and-destroy tactics of U.S. ground troops proved ineffective in the fluid guerrilla war waged by the Viet Cong.

These larger engagements attracted most of the public’s attention, but they were not in fact typical of the war in South Vietnam. Most “battles” of the war were sharp, very brief engagements between units of fewer than 200 men. Many of these lasted only a few hours, often only a few minutes, but nevertheless could result in heavy casualties. Overall, communist casualties far outnumbered U.S. casualties, but the North Vietnamese never came close to depleting their manpower. In any case, the communists could, when necessary, ease the pressure on themselves by withdrawing their forces to sanctuaries in nearby Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. Hanoi, not Washington, largely controlled the tempo of the ground war.


B-52 bombing during the Vietnam WarBoeing B-52 Stratofortress, a U.S. high-altitude bomber, dropping a stream of bombs over Vietnam.

Like the ground war in the South, the air campaign against the North continued to grow in scope and destructiveness but remained indecisive. By the end of 1966, the United States had dropped more bombs on North Vietnam than it had dropped on Japan during World War II and more than it had dropped during the entire Korean War. Yet the bombing seemed to have little impact on the communists’ ability to carry on the war. North Vietnam was primarily an agricultural country with few industries to destroy. Many of the necessities of Hanoi’s war effort came directly from China and the Soviet Union, which competed with each other to demonstrate support for Ho Chi Minh’s “heroic” war against U.S. imperialism. The Soviets provided an estimated 1.8 billion rubles in military and economic aid and sent 3,000 military advisers and technicians along with sophisticated weapons to the North. China spent an estimated two billion dollars in assisting Hanoi; at the height of its effort, it had more than 300,000 engineering, medical, and anti-aircraft artillery troops in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Even when bombing knocked out more than 80 percent of the North’s petroleum-storage facilities during the summer of 1966, the CIA reported no discernible shortages of petroleum or disruption of transportation. While the air raids continued, North Vietnam progressively strengthened its air defenses with the help of the latest radars, anti-aircraft guns, missiles, and modern jet fighters supplied by the Soviets and Chinese. By the end of 1966 the United States had already lost almost 500 aircraft and hundreds of air crewmen killed or held as prisoners of war.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Tet brings the war home​

Protest against the Vietnam WarProtesters demonstrating against the Vietnam War, New York City, April 27, 1968.


Vietnam WarDemonstrator offering a flower to a military police officer during a protest against the Vietnam War at the Pentagon, Arlington county, Virginia, U.S., October 21, 1967.

By 1967 growing numbers of Americans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the war. Some, especially students, intellectuals, academics, and clergymen, opposed the war on moral grounds, pointing out that large numbers of civilians in both the North and the South were becoming the chief victims of the war and that the United States was in reality supporting a corrupt and oppressive dictatorship in Saigon. Campus protests became common, and youthful picketers sometimes ringed the White House, chanting, “Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?” In October 1967 at least 35,000 demonstrators staged a mass protest outside the Pentagon. Many more Americans, not part of any peace movement, opposed the war because of the increasing American casualties and the lack of evidence that the United States was winning. Still other Americans believed that Johnson was not doing what was necessary to win the war and was obliging the military to fight “with one hand tied behind its back.” By the summer of 1967 fewer than 50 percent of polled citizens said they supported the president’s conduct of the war.

In Hanoi the communist leadership was also becoming impatient with the progress of the war. Although pleased with their ability to hold their own against the more-numerous and better-armed Americans and their South Vietnamese allies, they were aware that the United States showed no sign of giving up its hopes of victory and indeed had continued to pour more troops into Vietnam. In the summer of 1967 the communists decided on a bold stroke that would cripple the Saigon government and destroy once and for all American expectations of success. Their plan was to launch simultaneous military attacks at cities, towns, and military installations, combined with popular uprisings throughout the country. The “general offensive/general uprising” was scheduled to occur during the Lunar New Year festival, or Tet, early in 1968.
To distract attention from their preparations and attract U.S. forces away from the large cities, the communists launched diversionary attacks in October 1967 against the important but isolated town of Dak To in the central highlands and against Loc Ninh on the route to Saigon.

Finally, beginning in late January 1968, two North Vietnamese divisions began a prolonged offensive against the Marine base at Khe Sanh, in the northwest corner of South Vietnam near the Laotian border. Like other bases along the DMZ, Khe Sanh was within range of artillery in North Vietnam, and, beginning on January 21, the North Vietnamese unleashed a heavy barrage against it. News reports repeatedly drew comparisons between Khe Sanh and the siege of the French fortress at Dien Bien Phu. Both the president and General Westmoreland were convinced that Khe Sanh was the enemy’s main objective and that signs of a communist buildup in the urban areas were merely a diversion.


execution of a suspected Viet Cong officer in the Vietnam WarSouth Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan executing suspected Viet Cong officer Nguyen Van Lem in Saigon, South Vietnam, February 1, 1968.


Learn about the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong's surprise attacks and occupation of HueOn January 31, 1968, at the beginning of the traditional New Year festival of Tet, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched an all-out offensive.

Exactly the opposite was the case. On January 31, while approximately 50,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops were occupied in defending or supporting Khe Sanh and other DMZ bases, the communists launched an offensive throughout South Vietnam. They attacked 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 64 district capitals, five of the six major cities, and more than two dozen airfields and bases. Westmoreland’s Saigon headquarters came under attack, and a VC squad even penetrated the compound of the U.S. embassy. In Hue, the former imperial Vietnamese capital, communist troops seized control of more than half the city and held it for nearly three weeks.


Discover the effect of the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive on American morale despite the attack's failureThe Tet Offensive was a military failure for the Viet Cong, but, at the same time, it devastated the American public's support for the war.

Although taken by surprise, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces struck back quickly against the often poorly coordinated attacks. With the exception of Hue, the communists were unable to hold any town or base for more than a day or two, and their forces suffered extremely heavy casualties. South Vietnamese soldiers, often defending their homes and families, fought surprisingly well, and nowhere did the population rise up to support the Viet Cong. Indeed, so destructive were some communist attacks that many in the local population, while still disliking the Saigon government, became far less supportive of the Viet Cong.

U.S. and South Vietnamese troops may have recovered quickly, but that was not true of Americans at home. The Tet Offensive sent shock waves throughout the United States, startling those who had believed the White House’s claims that victory was near and convincing those with doubts that the situation was even worse than they had imagined. Television coverage of the destructive fighting in Saigon and Hue was extensive and graphic and left many with the impression that the United States and its ally were in desperate straits. Many in Washington still expected a major battle at Khe Sanh or further large communist attacks elsewhere.


Clark Clifford, 1968.

As criticism of Johnson’s leadership by political leaders and the media mounted, the public was shocked to read in a New York Times headline story on March 10 that General Westmoreland had requested 206,000 additional troops for Vietnam. This news was widely interpreted as confirmation that the U.S. situation in Vietnam must be dire indeed. In fact, Westmoreland, assessing the Tet attacks as a serious defeat for the communists, wanted the additional troops to deliver a knockout blow against the weakened enemy. He had been encouraged to request the troops by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who saw this as an opportunity finally to mobilize the reserves and reconstitute a strategic reserve for use in contingencies other than Vietnam. The president turned the request over to his new secretary of defense, Clark Clifford, who had replaced a disillusioned McNamara a few weeks before. Clifford soon decided not only that massive reinforcements were ill-advised but that the entire war effort had to be reassessed.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Total number of deaths​

Estimates of the total number of deaths in the Vietnam War vary widely. The wide disparity among the estimates cited below is partially explained by the different time periods of the Vietnam War covered by the studies and whether casualties in Cambodia and Laos were included in the estimates.

A 1975 US Senate subcommittee estimated around 1.4 million civilian casualties in South Vietnam because of the war, including 415,000 deaths. An estimate by the Department of Defense after the war gave a figure of 1.2 million civilian casualties, including 195,000 deaths.

According to statistics from the South Vietnamese Ministry of Health, 44.5% of civilians admitted to hospitals between 1967 and 1970 were wounded by mines or mortars, 21.2% by guns or grenades, and 34.3% by artillery or bombing.

Guenter Lewy in 1978 estimated 1,353,000 total deaths in North and South Vietnam during the period 1965–1974 in which the U.S. was most engaged in the war. Lewy reduced the number of Viet Cong (VC) and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) battle deaths claimed by the U.S. by 30 percent (in accordance with the opinion of United States Department of Defense officials), and assumed that one third of the reported battle deaths of the PAVN/VC may have actually been civilians. He estimates that between 30 and 46% of the total war deaths were civilians.

Deaths in Vietnam War (1965–1974) per Guenter Lewy

US and allied military deaths	282,000
PAVN/VC military deaths	444,000–666,000
Civilian deaths (North and South Vietnam)	405,000–627,000
Total deaths	1,353,000

A 1995 demographic study in Population and Development Review calculated 791,000–1,141,000 war-related Vietnamese deaths, both soldiers and civilians, for all of Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The study came up with a most likely Vietnamese death toll of 882,000, which included 655,000 adult males (above 15 years of age), 143,000 adult females, and 84,000 children. Those totals include only Vietnamese deaths, and do not include American and other allied military deaths which amounted to about 64,000. The study's authors stated that methodological limitations of the study include imbalance between rural and urban areas and the potential exclusion of high mortality areas. Another potential limitation is the relatively small sample size of the study.

In 1995, the Vietnamese government released its estimate of war deaths for the more lengthy period of 1955–75. PAVN and VC losses were reported as 1.1 million dead and civilian deaths of Vietnamese on both sides totaled 2.0 million. These estimates probably include deaths of Vietnamese soldiers in Laos and Cambodia, but do not include deaths of South Vietnamese and allied soldiers which would add nearly 300,000 for a grand total of 3.4 million military and civilian dead.

A 2008 study by the BMJ (formerly British Medical Journal) came up with a higher toll of 3,812,000 dead in Vietnam between 1955 and 2002. For the period of the Vietnam War the totals are 1,310,000 between 1955 and 1964, 1,700,000 between 1965–74 and 810,000 between 1975 and 1984. (The estimates for 1955–64 are much higher than other estimates). The sum of those totals is 3,091,000 war deaths between 1955 and 1975.

Uppsala University in Sweden maintains the Armed Conflict Database. Their estimates for conflict deaths in Vietnam are 164,923 from 1955 to 1964 and 1,458,050 from 1965 to 1975 for a total of 1,622,973. The database also estimates combat deaths in Cambodia for the years 1967–75 to total 259,000. Data for deaths in Laos is incomplete.

R. J. Rummel's mid-range estimate in 1997 was that the total deaths due to the Vietnam War totaled 2,450,000 from 1954 to 1975. Rummel calculated PAVN/VC deaths at 1,062,000 and ARVN and allied war deaths of 741,000, with both totals including civilians inadvertently killed. He estimated that victims of democide (deliberate killing of civilians) included 214,000 by North Vietnam/VC and 98,000 by South Vietnam and its allies. Deaths in Cambodia and Laos were estimated at 273,000 and 62,000 respectively.

Deaths in Vietnam War (1954–75) per R. J. Rummel (except where otherwise noted)

	Low estimate of deaths	Middle estimate of deaths	High estimate of deaths	Notes and comments
North Vietnam/Viet Cong military and civilian war dead	533,000	1,062,000	1,489,000	includes an estimated 50,000/65,000/70,000 civilians killed by U.S/SVN bombing/shelling[9]
South Vietnam/U.S./South Korea war military and civilian war dead	429,000	741,000	1,119,000	includes 360,000/391,000/720,000 civilians[10]
Democide by North Vietnam/Viet Cong	131,000	214,000	302,000	25,000/50,000/75,000 killed in North Vietnam, 106,000/164,000/227,000 killed in South Vietnam
Democide by South Vietnam	57,000	89,000	284,000	Democide is the murder of persons by or at the behest of governments.
Democide by the United States	4,000	6,000	10,000	Democide is the murder of persons by or at the behest of governments.
Democide by South Korea	3,000	3,000	3,000	Rummel does not give a medium or high estimate.
Subtotal Vietnam	1,156,000	2,115,000	3,207,000
Cambodians	273,000	273,000	273,000	Rummel estimates 212,000 killed by Khmer Rouge (1967–1975), 60,000 killed by U.S. and 1,000 killed by South Vietnam (1967–73). No estimate given for deaths caused by Viet Cong/North Vietnam (1954–75).[8]
Laotians	28,000	62,000	115,000	[5]
Grand total of war deaths: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (1954–75)	1,450,000	2,450,000	3,595,000

It's what the US Military wont tell you is that 210.000 Soldiers returned home committed Suicide suffering from PTSD ...


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The Honor Flight Bay Area Chapter 10/2023

SPC 5 Tatum Paul D. US Army / Viet Nam Veteran Combat Graduate

As a veteran chosen by the Honor Flight Bay Area (California) Foundation to be part of Honor Flight 32, my excitement was building in the early morning hours of Thursday, October 19, 2023. I didn’t know what to expect when I left my car transport and entered the San Francisco International Airport at Alaska Airlines Gate 2, Door 1. We met in an area of the airport that served as a gathering place for the 27 Honored Veterans and Guardians; it was a spot to assemble and bond with each other for the journey ahead. This was hard for me because I don’t bond easily as a result of my PTSD and other wounds stemming from my wartime experiences. The gathering hole was filling up with Red and Blue shirts and the overall age of this group was just my style — seasoned. The Staff in the White shirts mustered us to explain the itinerary and the rules of the flight, and give us an overview of what was in store for us.

The group was getting restless and excited as we headed toward the Security Gate check point and the flight departure time grew near. We were happy to see no one was left behind due to any contraband carry-ons. We headed to the Gate area in our wheelchairs, ready to take on coffee and snacks and last instructions before boarding. Our flight would take about 5 hours, and would land at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Northern Virginia.

Now this is the time to take you back to the 1970s when I was released and discharged from the United States Army at Fort Lewis (Washington). It didn’t go well for many of us when we re-entered the civilian population and came in contact with people. We were greeted with human spit and vulgar scorn, trash was thrown at us, and at times there was rough physical contact. This was not what I expected to encounter on coming home. I was made to feel humiliated and disgusted by what I had been trained to do in order to save the world from tyranny. I failed to win that war and save the world — and I felt it was true what they screamed at me: “human baby killer, murderers….” I have never recovered from my war, never forgotten what I did, and I have been living in fear and silence for the past 53 years. This was a true horror that we experienced. It caused traumatic impairment, and we all had to both carry it and face it when we came home. And yet, I felt alone. I felt I had no dignity left as a human. Yes, hurry … Uncle Sam Needs You.

As a Soldier from the Viet Nam Era, I discovered most people either hated or loved you. But mostly they hated us because of the crimes against humanity that we did inflict. Civilians were unfair in their judgment against all service members and acted stupidly and with malice. They had no compassion or understanding of what our job was. We all still carry this burden today — along with the disabilities and mental afflictions we acquired from both the battlefield and the “homecoming.”

Now, let’s move back to the present and Honor Flight 32.

We landed on time. Civilians disembarked from the plane first. Several of the vets were in wheelchairs, including me. Our group was led to a staging area just Inside the main entrance to the terminal. The doors opened, and we were greeted by about 300 people, including honored dignitaries. Cheering erupted with “Welcome home!” and applause filled the terminal. This was overwhelming, and as tears dripped from my face, I found it hard to believe this greeting was all for us — a real welcoming home. Along the pathway through the terminal, people came up to us, to touch and shake our hands, and with joy in their hearts, they welcomed us home. This continued while we all boarded the charter bus to the Hilton Hotel where we were greeted again as we stepped down from the bus.

I looked around, and I saw our group members in tears and trying to comfort each other. We huddled by the front door of the Hotel, ready to be escorted inside. There was a lull for a moment as we all tried to steady our emotions. Thank God the bar was open and dinner was waiting in the main dining room. As we wheeled ourselves down the corridor, it felt as though we were “Coming into the Light.” We were all filled with a kind of wonder, and ready to share our feelings with each other about the arrival. This experience will never dissolve from out hearts, it was the best of times. And with that glow and warmth among us, dinner was served.

The next morning at Reveille, we slowly rolled into the dining hall, still under the influence from the night before. We took turns at the breakfast buffet, and as we ate, we shared more stories revealing our military experiences. There was a long day ahead of us, so better buck up and get with the program!

And the next two days were full. We visited each Military Memorial and National Site: National Museum of the US Army; World War II Memorial; Arlington National Cemetery; Military Women’s Memorial; Korean War Veterans Memorial; Viet Nam Veterans Memorial; US Navy Memorial; US Air Force Memorial; US Marine Corps Memorial (Iwo Jima); The Pentagon; The White House; The Capitol Building; and the Washington Monument. At the Navy Museum, there was a special performance by the Honor Guard for us — the Veterans of Viet Nam.

And lastly, here is the story of the Flight Home to the Bay Area, and my reflections on this trip.

After two long days In Virginia and Washington DC, we were ready to return home. We were certainly in a better and happier disposition than when we started out — we now had a kind of resolution and peace of mind. I took refuge in knowing I was a liberated person now, free of persecution and resentment for doing my job overseas, released from the stigma of betrayal from the public eye. We boarded the bus and headed to the Reagan Airport. We disembarked from the bus and moved inside the terminal into the RSA check point. It was good to see all the Veterans laughing and scratching and having a good time with each other. We were more at ease now, and we felt fulfilled. Another 5 hour flight to San Francisco — everyone closed their window shade and took a long nap.

When our flight was minutes away from landing at SFO, I realized it had been a long flight for us senior citizens. Yet we all snapped to attention as the wheels touched down. We were ready to disembark and head home. That didn’t happen right away! Again, we let the civilians off first, and our group was held at the staging door inside the terminal. The doors opened and all I could see was a mass of people cheering and holding up posters that said “Welcome Home.” People rushed up to hug us and the cheering was quite loud. Again, tears came to my eyes. Warm and fuzzy emotions overwhelmed me again, just as it did at Reagan Airport a few days earlier.

It was difficult to move to the front gate because of all the cheering people; but there was one more surprise ahead of us. We never got a parade when we returned home — we got nothing — zip — not even a “Welcome Home.” So today we were about to have a real parade, just for us. We all lined up three across and the Flight Leader Timothy gave us the “Welcome Home” address. This was very moving. I heard bagpipes in the background, and I saw the Honor Guard and Service Troops holding their flags in front of us. Civilians lined the pathway, still cheering and and holding up their signs.

We were all truly Honored and overwhelmed! What came next was a real parade just for us all the way to the front door. Tears never stopped. I felt loved and respected as a Soldier, a feeling I never experienced 53 years ago. I could not stop crying! My emotions were out of control and we had only travelled 100 feet down the terminal. I looked back and all the Veterans were in tears and holding their heads high — absorbing all the love and warmth that filled the terminal. To me, this was over the top and so well presented. Everyone gave back to us Veterans, they show us we are all respected, and they gave us what we never had on our Return from War.

By participating in this journey, I have made new Veteran connections with my lost brothers.

A very big “Thank you” to all Honor Flight Bay Area Staff.
A special Thank you to Ethan Frazier my Guardian

Sponsors and Contributors
Veterans Administration
American Legion
Alaska Air Lines
Dovenmuehle
VFW
National Vet Center
VSO

Coordinators and Staff
Connie Johnson Coordinator
Carolyn Wong Coordinators
Timothy Smith Flight Leader
Gary Laine Asst Leader / Trip Portraits
Valarie Rick Flight Nurse
Donna Colombo Flight Photographer / Tour Guide

Recipients
US Army
US Navy
US Air Force
US Marine Corps
US Coast Guard

This has been a great Honor to be welcomed home.


Paul David Tatum

 

[whitefish]

Cambodian genocide​

Skulls of Khmer Rouge victims

Cambodian genocide, systematic murder of up to three million people in Cambodia from 1976 to 1978 that was carried out by the Khmer Rouge government under Pol Pot.

Immediately after World War II, the Americans and the French fought wars against communism in Korea and Vietnam, respectively. Cambodia became independent in 1953 when French Indochina collapsed under the assault of Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh communist army. Cambodia’s constitutional monarchy under Prince Sihanouk remained neutral during the Vietnam War, until he was ousted in 1970 by an American-backed coup. Forced to seek refuge in Beijing, he became the figurehead for communist Khmer Rouge insurgents, whose cause was greatly aided when the United States bombed Cambodia in an attempt to suppress guerrilla activity. Cambodia’s civil war ended in 1975 when capital city Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge, who renamed the country Kampuchea.

Pol Pot declared 1975 to be “Year Zero,” when Cambodia was to be isolated and its society remade in accordance with communist ideals. Civil rights and property rights were immediately eliminated, and any public expression of religious belief was forbidden. Taking the view that Cambodian society had been corrupted by exposure to the world beyond Cambodia’s borders, the new regime started destroying evidence of Western influence, emptying cities and force-marching the urban population into the countryside to engage in hopelessly inadequate agricultural projects. As starvation and disease set in, these actions alone would have created a significant humanitarian disaster.

The Khmer Rouge also persecuted and killed minorities, particularly ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese, in large numbers. Other targets included Cham Muslims, of whom 70–80 percent of the population was exterminated; professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers; and anyone who could remotely be described as “intellectual,” which included anyone wearing spectacles or who could speak a foreign language. The Tuol Sleng Prison in Phnom Penh became a center for mass murder, and there were rural sites—referred to as the Killing Fields, which is also the title of a 1984 film that brought the plight of Khmer Rouge victims to worldwide attention—where a huge number of people were executed. As hundreds of thousands of Cambodians fled into Thailand, the genocide intensified, with the Khmer Rouge turning on itself and murdering thousands of suspected traitors and spies in its ranks.


Victims of the Cambodian genocideVisitors viewing an exhibit showing photos of victims of the Cambodian genocide; at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

By November 1978, when Vietnam invaded and put an end to the Khmer Rouge’s excesses, at least 1.25 million and as many as 3 million Cambodians had died as a result of Khmer Rouge action; Cambodia’s population had been 7.5 million. Even though the Khmer Rouge kept extensive records, many disappeared into Vietnamese archives, and so the exact number of victims has not been ascertained; the working consensus is 2 million.

In 1979, following the Khmer Rouge’s defeat at the hands of Vietnamese forces, the movement’s de facto leader fled into the jungles on Cambodia’s border with Thailand where he maintained the pretense of leading a legitimate government. Pol Pot died in 1998 while under house arrest imposed by rivals within the Khmer Rouge, which largely disintegrated afterward. Vietnam occupied Cambodia until 1989, and free elections were held in 1993, inaugurating a democratic government.

The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, formally known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, was established in 2006 as an effort to bring surviving leaders to justice, and trials held under its auspices secured a number of convictions. In 2012 Kaing Guek Eav, the commandant of Tuol Sleng Prison, was sentenced to life in prison for crimes against humanity; he died in 2020. In 2018 Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, two high-ranking Khmer Rouge officials, were convicted of genocide. The Tribunal ceased active litigation in 2022 but has not been decommissioned.


Tuol Sleng Genocide MuseumThe Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum located in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

The genocide is a locus of Cambodian memory today. Under the Vietnamese occupation, part of the Tuol Sleng Prison, also called S-21, was converted into a museum, and today it sees significant visitation from Cambodians and foreign tourists alike. Signs across the rural countryside mark the sites of former killing fields. An extensive Cambodian exodus to the United States followed the years of genocide, and observances by expatriates are held at Chicago’s National Cambodian Heritage Museum and Killing Fields Memorial and elsewhere in the country.

Khmer Rouge,

Radical communist movement that ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 after winning power through a guerrilla war. It was purportedly set up in 1967 as the armed wing of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge government under Pol Pot was responsible for the Cambodian genocide (1976-78), during which up to three million people were murdered.

Cambodia’s communist movement originated in the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party, which was formed in 1951 under the auspices of the Viet Minh of Vietnam. The party’s largely French-educated Marxist leaders eventually renamed it the Communist Party of Kampuchea. By the late 1950s the party’s members were engaged in clandestine activities against the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, but for many years they made little headway against Sihanouk from their bases in remote jungle and mountain areas, partly because of Sihanouk’s own popularity among the peasants whom the communists sought to incite to rebellion.

After a right-wing military coup toppled Sihanouk in 1970, however, the Khmer Rouge entered into a political coalition with him and began attracting increased support in the Cambodian countryside, a trend that was accelerated by the destructive U.S. bombing campaigns over Cambodia in the early 1970s. By this time the Khmer Rouge were also receiving substantial aid from North Vietnam, which had withheld its support during the years of Sihanouk’s rule.


Pol Pot, 1980.

In a civil war that continued for nearly five years from 1970, the Khmer Rouge gradually expanded the areas of the Cambodian countryside under their control. Finally, in April 1975, Khmer Rouge forces mounted a victorious attack on the capital city of Phnom Penh and established a national government to rule Cambodia. The military leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, became the new government’s prime minister. The Khmer Rouge’s rule over the next four years was marked by some of the worst excesses of any Marxist government in the 20th century, during which an estimated 1.5 million (and possibly up to 2 million) Cambodians died and many of the country’s professional and technical class were exterminated.

The Khmer Rouge government was overthrown in 1979 by invading Vietnamese troops, who installed a puppet government propped up by Vietnamese aid and expertise. The Khmer Rouge retreated to remote areas and resumed guerrilla warfare, this time operating from bases near the border with Thailand and obtaining aid from China. In 1982 they formed a fragile coalition (under the nominal leadership of Sihanouk) with two noncommunist Khmer groups opposed to the Vietnamese-backed central government. The Khmer Rouge was the strongest partner in this coalition, which carried on guerrilla warfare until 1991. The Khmer Rouge opposed the United Nations-sponsored peace settlement of 1991 and the multiparty elections in 1993, and they continued guerrilla warfare against the noncommunist coalition government formed after those elections.

Isolated in the remote western provinces of the country and increasingly dependent on gem smuggling for their funding, the Khmer Rouge suffered a series of military defeats and grew weaker from year to year. In 1995 many of their cadres accepted an offer of amnesty from the Cambodian government, and in 1996 one of their leading figures, Ieng Sary, defected along with several thousand guerrillas under his command and signed a peace agreement with the government. The disarray within the organization intensified in 1997, when Pol Pot was arrested by other Khmer Rouge leaders and sentenced to life imprisonment. Pol Pot died in 1998, and soon afterward the surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge defected or were imprisoned.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

In the Past Decade, VA Has Recouped $2.4 Billion in Separation Pay, Bonuses from Disabled Vets​

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In the past decade, the Department of Veterans Affairs has recouped more than $2 billion from veterans who received separation pay from the Defense Department and later filed for disability compensation, an effort that has resulted in financial hardship for some former service members.

According to data provided by the VA, the department has collected $2.44 billion from 112,834 veterans since 2013 under a law that department officials say prohibits it from paying disability compensation to those who received voluntary or involuntary separation pay or bonuses until the money has been recouped.

While the VA has been required to recover the money since the 1940s – and the Defense Department is required to inform transitioning service members of this potential transaction – veterans have been surprised when the recoupment letters arrive, in some cases decades after they received the money.

Read Next: FBI Arrests Marine Veteran After He Self-Published Book on His Role in Jan. 6 Riot at Capitol

Former Air Force officer Raymond Thomas received $30,000 in separation pay in 1990 and, following a series of government administrative missteps, was told earlier this year his monthly disability compensation, which he uses to cover his vehicle and living quarters, would be withheld completely until the money was returned.

Thomas reached a payment agreement with the VA after he told his story to Military.com, but he still feels like the problem should have been resolved in the years following his release from military duty.

Vernon Reffitt, who served as a dog handler in the Army for more than 13 years, was awarded a $38,000 incentive to leave the service in 1992 as part of the drawdown following the 1991 Persian Gulf War. At the same time, he received a 10% disability rating from the VA and has been getting a small check for more than 30 years.

When he applied for benefits under the PACT Act, his claim was denied, but the VA noticed he had received a separation bonus and started recoupment efforts.

"It's not the VA's money," Reffitt said Monday during an interview with Military.com. "It was given to me by the Army as part of a drawdown situation, so that I would not stay in the military. ... I got my VA disability rating the same day and collected both. Why would the Army give me $30,000 [after taxes] that the VA could just take back the next day? It's stupid."

According to VA data, the recoupment effort hit a peak in 2018 with the department collecting more than $396 million from 17,066 veterans. Last year, it collected nearly $148 million from more than 9,000 former service members.

VA spokesman Gary Kunich said the department tries to identify those who are required to repay "as early as possible" and understands that the effort may present a hardship to some veterans.

He added that, since September 2021, the VA has taken steps to resolve recoupment cases more efficiently and is making an effort to ensure that veterans understand the process when they file a disability compensation claim.

For those already receiving benefits, the VA will "work with them every step of the way to minimize any impact this may have on them," Kunich said.

A bill was introduced last year, the Restore Veterans' Compensation Act, by Reps. Ruben Gallego, D-Ariz., and Gus Bilirakis, R-Fla., that would eliminate the requirement for VA to recoup separation pay and incentive payments for veterans who receive disability compensation, but it has not been considered by either the House Armed Services or Veterans Affairs committees.

Reffitt said he'd like to see the legislation passed because the recoupment effort is "just wrong."

"The No. 1 thing I'd like to see happen is for the recoupment to stop. There's no reason to give somebody money just to take it back 30 years later. Either stop giving bonuses or stop the recoupment. And the other thing is, if you are wrong, pay for it."

He said when he accepted the separation pay, he knew that he would have to pay it back if he returned to military service and eventually retired. He had no idea that the VA had any authority over collecting money from disability pay.

"If the Army's wrong for putting this out under false pretenses, then they need to pay. If the VA is wrong in missing me for 30 years, then they need to just suffer the loss. It shouldn't be me all stressed out and anxious because they made a mistake," Reffitt said.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The Navy's First Vietnamese Admiral Saw His Family Killed by an Infamous Viet Cong Guerrilla​

Rear Adm. Huan Nguyen during his 2019 promotion ceremony. (U.S. Navy)

When South Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese forces in 1975, an estimated 125,000 Vietnamese refugees fled to the United States to avoid retribution at the hands of the North Vietnamese. Among those refugees was U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Huan Nguyen, the first Vietnamese-American ever to hold an admiral's rank. Nguyen's road to becoming a distinguished Navy officer was a long and tragic one, and begins with one of the war's most iconic photographs.

"America is the beacon of hope for all of us. There is no other place in the world where a person can go for such opportunity," Nguyen said at his 2019 promotion ceremony.Eddie Adams' photo of Viet Cong guerrilla Bay Lop being executed by South Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan made newspapers around the world in 1968. It became one of the most enduring images of the Vietnam War.

The photo fueled the anti-war movement back in the United States, which saw the photo as proof that the war was unjustified. But Adams' photo only tells half the story, as the former Marine Corps photographer admitted.

Bay Lop was executed in Saigon, on the second day of the Tet Offensive. He was captured after murdering South Vietnamese Lt. Col. Nguyen Tuan, along with the officer's wife, mother and six of his children. One of his children survived, however, after being shot through the arm and thigh. Another bullet pierced his skull.

1968, file photo, South Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan, chief of the National Police, fires his pistol into the head of suspected Viet Cong officer Nguyen Van Lem (also known as Bay Lop) on a Saigon street, early in the Tet Offensive. Early on the morning of Jan. 31, 1968, as Vietnamese celebrated the Lunar New Year, or Tet as it is known locally, Communist forces launched a wave of coordinated surprise attacks across South Vietnam. The campaign, one of the largest of the Vietnam War, led to intense fighting and heavy casualties in cities and towns across the South.

Nine-year-old Huan Nguyen stayed next to his mother for two hours after the murders. When night fell, he escaped the scene and avoided the communist guerrillas. The young boy was taken in by his uncle, a colonel in the South Vietnamese Air Force. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the officer and Nguyen escaped to the United States.

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps troops took care of the family as they made their way through Guam, along with thousands of other refugees, before being sponsored for relocation in the United States. U.S. Air Force Col. Ed Veiluva sponsored the family, which was resettled in Oklahoma as political refugees. By 1981, Nguyen earned a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from Oklahoma State University. He later earned master's degrees in electrical engineering, engineering and information technology. In 1993, he received a direct commission in the U.S. Navy through the Reserve Engineering Duty Officer Program.

Huan Nguyen was promoted to rear admiral in October 2019, at the time the highest-ranking Vietnamese-born officer in the U.S. Navy.

"The images that I remember vividly when I arrived at Camp Asan, Guam, now Asan Beach Park, were of American sailors and Marines toiling in the hot sun, setting up tents and chow halls, distributing water and hot food, helping and caring for the people with dignity and respect," Nguyen said. "I thought to myself how lucky I am to be in a place like America. Those sailors inspired me to later serve in the United States Navy."


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

The fall of South Vietnam​

Fall of Saigon during the Vietnam WarAir America helicopter evacuating Vietnamese officials and their families from the roof of an apartment building at 22 Gia Long Street in Saigon, South Vietnam, April 29, 1975.

On March 29, 1973, the last U.S. military unit left Vietnam. By that time the communists and South Vietnamese were already engaged in what journalists labeled the “postwar war.” Both sides alleged, more or less accurately, that the other side was continuously violating the terms of the peace agreements. The United States maintained its program of extensive military aid to Saigon, but the president’s ability to influence events in Vietnam was being sharply curtailed. As Nixon’s personal standing crumbled under the weight of Watergate revelations, Congress moved to block any possibility of further military action in Vietnam. In the summer of 1973 Congress passed a measure prohibiting any U.S. military operations in or over Indochina after August 15. Congress went a step further on November 7, 1973, when it overrode Nixon’s veto to pass the War Powers Act, a law that, in theory, required the president to consult with Congress before committing U.S. forces abroad.



See how communist forces turned Saigon into Ho Chi Minh City and created the Socialist Republic of VietnamIn the spring of 1975 the North Vietnamese army conquered all of South Vietnam, and the following year North and South were formally united in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The following year saw a discernible pattern of hostilities: lower levels of combat and casualties but unimpeded warfare along the never-defined zones of control of the South Vietnamese government and the communists. Hundreds of Vietnamese continued to lose their lives each day after the fighting was supposed to have stopped. By the summer of 1974 Nixon had resigned in disgrace, Congress had cut military and economic aid to Vietnam by 30 percent, and the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia appeared close to defeat. Thieu’s government, corrupt and inefficient as ever, now faced enormous difficulties with inflation, unemployment, apathy, and an enormous desertion rate in the army. After an easy success at Phuoc Long, northeast of Saigon, in December 1974–January 1975, the Hanoi leaders believed that victory was near.


Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger during the Fall of SaigonU.S. Pres. Gerald Ford and senior advisers receiving an update from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger about the evacuation of U.S. personnel from Saigon, South Vietnam (now Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam), April 29, 1975.


fall of SaigonTranscript of helicopter radio transmissions during the fall of Saigon, South Vietnam (now Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam).

In early March the North Vietnamese launched the first phase of what was expected to be a two-year offensive to secure South Vietnam. As it happened, the South’s government and army collapsed in less than two months. Thousands of ARVN troops retreated in disorder, first from the central highlands and then from Hue and Da Nang. Gerald R. Ford, who had succeeded Nixon as U.S. president, pleaded in vain with Congress for additional military aid that might at least raise Saigon’s morale. But members of Congress, like most of their constituents, were ready to wash their hands of a long and futile war. On April 21 Thieu resigned and flew to Taiwan. On April 30 what remained of the South Vietnamese government surrendered unconditionally, and NVA tank columns occupied Saigon without a struggle. The remaining Americans escaped in a series of frantic air- and sealifts with Vietnamese friends and coworkers. A military government was instituted, and on July 2, 1976, the country was officially united as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with its capital in Hanoi. Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City. The 30-year struggle for control over Vietnam was over.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

VA Failed to Inform 87,000 Vietnam Veterans About Agent Orange Benefits​

Vietnam Veterans salute during a 10th annual Vietnam Veterans Day Celebration hosted by the Vietnam Veterans of America Chapter 1067

A report this summer from a government watchdog estimates that the VA has failed to inform up to 87,000 Vietnam War Veterans and their survivors that they may now qualify for retroactive compensation benefits due to exposure to toxic herbicides like Agent Orange, according to Military.com.

This oversight could mean that Veterans and their families are missing out on more than $844 million in benefits, exposing a significant gap in the VA’s outreach efforts. Bart Stichman, co-founder of the National Veterans Legal Services Program, stressed the importance of ensuring that these Veterans receive the compensation they deserve.

“There are millions of dollars at stake that Vietnam Veterans and their survivors should be receiving,” Stichman said.

This issue comes as the VA faces growing pressure due to the recently passed PACT Act, which has expanded coverage for potentially six million more Veterans exposed to toxins from burn pits and other sources during the Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and post-9/11 wars. Linda Bilmes, a public policy professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, pointed out that the U.S. will soon owe trillions of dollars in medical and disability compensation to Veterans.

“We don’t really understand the cost… We don’t have a function that is keeping track of all of the accrued promised benefits the way we should,” she said, despite pledging support.

The VA’s current financial challenges are significant, with the department facing a $15 billion budget shortfall that could impact millions of Veterans’ benefits as soon as October. The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to a 1986 class action lawsuit, Nehmer vs. The Department of Veterans Affairs. The lawsuit required the VA to recognize “presumptive conditions” linked to Agent Orange and pay corresponding benefits. However, the VA has been criticized for its resistance to fully implementing these obligations. Despite a 2021 announcement that the VA would notify all Vietnam Veterans previously denied benefits, the watchdog report found that nearly tens of thousands of Veterans and survivors might have been overlooked.

One of the key challenges in this situation is the fragmented structure of the VA, with the Veterans Benefits Administration responsible for disability payments and the Veterans Health Administration handling healthcare. This division has led to confusion over which Veterans should be notified about potential benefits. The Office of Inspector General recommended sending new letters to those overlooked, but the Benefits Administration has resisted, likely due to the strain it would place on an already burdened system.

Amid these challenges, volunteers like Marc McCabe, who works with the Vietnam Veterans of America, continue to help Veterans and their families navigate the complex benefits process. The VA’s failure to reach out to all eligible Veterans remains a significant issue, and with the financial future of Veterans’ benefits programs uncertain, experts like Bilmes are advocating for solutions such as creating a trust fund to ensure that promised benefits are secured.

For more information, readers can contact the National Veterans Legal Service Program at agentorange@nvlsp.org.



US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

National Suicide Prevention Month: Supporting Veterans and Families with TAPS and Vital Resources.

September is National Suicide Prevention Month and serves as a reminder of the critical need to address mental health challenges, particularly among Veterans and their families.

On average, approximately 22 Veterans tragically take their own lives each day, emphasizing the severity of this national crisis. Research has revealed that the military and Veteran suicide rate is 50 percent higher than that of civilians, making it a deeply concerning statistic. Multiple factors experienced by Veterans contribute to the crisis, including PTSD, survivor’s guilt, financial strain, and family issues.

The Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors, TAPS, a national nonprofit organization since 1994, has been a pillar of support for those grieving the loss of military or Veteran loved ones. TAPS offers resources and compassionate care free of charge. Their commitment to providing comfort and hope extends 24/7 through a national peer support network, grief resources, and various programs tailored to survivors worldwide.

To combat this national crisis, essential resources like the Veterans Crisis Line exist. This free, confidential crisis resource is available to Veterans, their families, and friends around the clock, staffed by trained responders, some of whom are Veterans themselves.

The VA has also developed the PTSD Coach website and app to assist troops and Veterans in managing issues like anger, sleep disturbances, and trauma triggers. Additionally, the VA’s Mental Health webpage offers a wealth of resources to address various mental health concerns.

Recognizing the signs of crisis is paramount. If you encounter someone who exhibits thoughts of self-harm, looking for ways to end their life, or discussing death and suicide, it is imperative to take action immediately. Self-destructive behaviors such as substance abuse or weapons-related actions also demand immediate attention.

For Veterans or service members in crisis, the Veterans Crisis Line stands ready with 24/7/365 resources. You can call 1-800-273-8255 and Press 1, text to 838255


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

[whitefish]

Vietnamese female soldiers - Woman at War​

The Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, was a war that lasted for twenty years from 1955 to 1975. The superpowers are all involved. In this war, people often overlook a key role-Vietnamese female soldiers.
They bravely stood on the front line and fought to defend the motherland. Their experiences and contributions still leave a profound impact on Vietnamese society.

However, in the chaos and brutality of war, the treatment these female soldiers may face is not just the danger of fighting. Many were trapped behind enemy lines and became prisoners of war. There are rumors that Vietnamese female soldiers will take off their clothes after being captured? If yes, what were the motivations and implications behind such behavior?
Women were not only victims but important participants in the Vietnam War. The roles of Vietnamese female soldiers are diverse, including traditional logistical support roles and active combat roles.

The long history of Vietnamese female soldiers can be traced back to the first Indochina War after Vietnam's independence in 1945. During this war, many female soldiers joined the Communist Party of Vietnam to fight against French colonial rule. Not only did they fight on the front lines, but they also took on a lot of logistical and intelligence work. The war ultimately ended with the defeat of France at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and northern Vietnam became an independent socialist state.

Vietnamese female soldiers also displayed outstanding courage and skill. They often participated in the battle on the front line, using guerrilla tactics to defend and counterattack the French army. They often display outstanding leadership and bravery in battle, and some female soldiers have earned a high degree of respect and honor on the battlefield.

Vietnamese female soldiers also played an important role in the rear, and they participated in logistics support, medical rescue and intelligence collection. Vietnamese female soldiers played a key role in transporting supplies, caring for the wounded and gathering information on the enemy. Their efforts have ensured that the battle on the front line can proceed smoothly.

In the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the Vietnamese army won a decisive victory, France was forced to abandon its colonial rule over North Vietnam, and northern Vietnam became an independent socialist country. This victory was achieved by the joint efforts of all Vietnamese people, including many female fighters. The war demonstrated the strength and determination of Vietnamese women, whose contributions have had a profound impact on Vietnamese history.

Why did foreign countries, especially the United States and France, choose to intervene militarily in Vietnam? , What wars did they launch against Vietnam?

In 1955, a speech by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in Kenoch, Indiana, laid out a policy that was an important part of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and was key to U.S. eventual involvement in the Vietnam War factor.

In his speech, Dulles made it clear that if any Southeast Asian country was invaded by communist forces, the United States would take necessary actions to defend it. This is based on the so-called "domino theory", which states that if one country falls to communism, then nearby countries will follow suit, like a row of dominoes. Therefore, the U.S. government considered it extremely important to prevent the spread of communism in Asia.

Dulles' speech demonstrated the determination of the United States to prevent the spread of global communism. This policy paved the way for the subsequent U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. In 1955, Vietnam split into South Vietnam, which was controlled by the Communist Party led by Ho Chi Minh, and North Vietnam, which was supported by the United States.

However, the corruption and instability of the South Vietnamese regime gradually worsened the situation in the country, leading to the rise of the Viet Cong guerrillas. In this case, Dulles' speech also provided a reason and basis for the United States to intervene in the Vietnam War.

On November 1, 1963, a coup that shocked the world took place in South Vietnam. South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his younger brother and adviser Ngo Dinh Shui were killed in the coup. The coup was sparked by the severe repression of Buddhists by Diem's government, which sparked massive protests in South Vietnam, and Diem's authoritarian methods have eroded his popularity with the military and the public.

In this coup, some senior officers of the South Vietnamese army launched a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem and established a military regime after the coup was successful. However, the coup did not bring stability. On the contrary, South Vietnam entered a period of frequent regime changes and political instability. In the next two and a half years, South Vietnam changed 10 leaders.

The coup plunged South Vietnam into chaos, creating plenty of opportunities for the Viet Cong guerrillas. In order to support the South Vietnamese regime and prevent South Vietnam from falling into communism, the US government increased military and economic assistance to South Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Until 1965, the United States officially launched a large-scale military intervention and began to send a large number of ground combat troops to South Vietnam, which marked the full-scale outbreak of the Vietnam War.

Although U.S. officials were not directly involved in the 1963 coup, their dissatisfaction with Diem's policies and their failure to act in support of him when the coup occurred partly allowed the coup to occur. This is also a typical example of how the United States sometimes supported undemocratic or even dictatorial regimes in order to prevent the expansion of communism during the Cold War.

How was the end of the two decades long Vietnam War brought about, and by what decisive battles and events was it brought about?

April 30, 1975, known as "The Last Hours of Saigon ," marked the final end of the Vietnam War. The United States had withdrawn its troops from Vietnam after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords the previous year, leaving only a small number of military advisers and diplomats in South Vietnam. However, the peace agreement did not end the conflict between North and South Vietnam.

In early 1975, the North Vietnamese Army launched a massive military campaign with the goal of ending the decades-long war. In just a few months, they managed to capture most of South Vietnam. On April 30, the North Vietnamese army entered Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, marking the final victory of the North Vietnamese army. The images of this day were widely disseminated, especially the scene of the emergency evacuation of American citizens and some Vietnamese refugees on the roof of the US embassy helicopter, which became a representative image of the Vietnam War.

Saigon's final moments are a symbol of Vietnam's unification. After the war, Vietnam underwent national reunification and Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City in honor of Vietnam's revolutionary leader. Vietnam also became a socialist country, officially known as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Despite decades of war and destruction, Vietnam achieved some economic and social development in the ensuing decades. However, the trauma of war also left a profound impact on the Vietnamese people and country.

How did Vietnamese women play their important role in the Vietnam War, and what are their contributions?

The role of Vietnamese women in the war transcended many traditional gender roles. They were assigned to various positions and tasks, including caring for the wounded, artillery, scouts, interpreters, etc. They were also deployed to separate women's combat units for critical tactical operations, including reconnaissance, sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

The training and preparation of Vietnamese female soldiers was not much different from that of male soldiers. In military training, they received the same rigorous training, including physical training, tactical training and psychological training, to ensure that they could survive the harsh conditions of war. In addition, they are no less determined and courageous than men. Many Vietnamese female soldiers have shown strong patriotism and sacrifice, determined to defend their homeland even in the face of life and death.

However, the place of female soldiers in warfare is not always recognized. Their contributions are often overlooked and their experiences often forgotten. Even when they show bravery and determination on the battlefield, they are not immune to the sexism and abuse that war brings.

However, the performance of the Vietnamese female soldiers after being captured is surprising. They face extreme situations and difficult choices between life and death. An important finding was that many female Vietnamese soldiers chose to take off their clothes when captured. Motivations for this behavior vary, including luring enemies, showing oneself harmless, and buying time for oneself.

This behavior of Vietnamese female soldiers has achieved certain results among American soldiers. Because American culture is relatively open, some soldiers may be tempted by this move and ignore their vigilance. However, when they applied this strategy to the Chinese military, the results were quite different. The ethos of Chinese soldiers is more conservative, and they are usually embarrassed to watch, let alone be seduced. However, some Vietnamese female soldiers discovered this and took advantage of the embarrassment of Chinese soldiers and the moment when they diverted their attention to carry out sneak attacks.

Initially, the Chinese army was unprepared for this situation and paid a certain price. But over time, they gradually learned how to cope. For example, when they find that female soldiers start to take off their clothes, they will immediately raise their vigilance and will not be easily diverted.

But there are also many Vietnamese female soldiers whose motivation for undressing is purely aggressive. Many people do this, probably more to show their harmlessness and avoid accidental injury. In the face of this situation, Chinese soldiers usually show great restraint because their military discipline is very strict.

As for the results of the capture of Vietnamese female soldiers, most of them were sent to shelters and received proper care. Their treatment and living conditions are much better than those in Vietnam, which gradually moved many people who started to resist. After the war, when they returned to Vietnam, many people spread the Chinese policy of benevolence and righteousness, thus promoting the friendship between the two peoples and contributing to further peace.

Regarding the behavior of Vietnamese female soldiers taking off their clothes after being captured on the battlefield, was it voluntary or was it an order issued by the Vietnamese leadership? What is the purpose of this move?

The Vietnamese leadership believes that this behavior can protect the lives of female soldiers to a certain extent, or gain a combat advantage for the Vietnamese army.

However, this strategy may cause serious psychological and physical harm to female soldiers themselves. First of all, this kind of behavior is undoubtedly a violation of personal dignity, which may cause lasting damage to the psychology of female soldiers.

Second, while this tactic may have saved their lives in the short term, it could also have made them targets of sexual assault. Furthermore, even if they managed to escape capture, their lives after the war may have been affected by the experience.

This phenomenon also reflects Vietnamese society's perception of women's roles and status. The undressing of Vietnamese female soldiers may be seen as a form of deprivation of female identity, where they are forced to give up their bodily autonomy in order to survive. This also reflects gender inequality and the low social status of women in Vietnamese society.

War is the most tragic chapter in human history. It took away not only countless lives, but also the hope of those living and the tranquility of their homes. Seeing what happened to Vietnamese female soldiers in the war, we are reminded once again that every war, no matter what the reasons behind it, no matter what its outcome, is a violation of human dignity and the value of life.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

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The Human Cost

"Mass for the Fallen,"

End of the Saga: The Maritime Evacuation of South Vietnam and Cambodia

A few figures from official sources suffice to introduce this section. During the Vietnam War's official duration (4 August 1964–27 January 1973), 1,631 Sailors and 13,095 Marines were killed in action; 4,178 and 51,392 respectively were wounded. These figures do not include non-combat deaths or injuries, or Southeast Asian conflict–related deaths, wounds, or injuries sustained by members of the two sea services prior to or after the period noted above. The nearly 600 U.S. POWs included 154 Navy personnel and 47 Marines. Of these, 18 (9 per service) died in captivity. Fifteen U.S Navy service members (6 posthumously) and 57 Marines (44 posthumously) were awarded the Medal of Honor.
South Vietnamese military losses during the same time frame are more than four-fold; South and North Vietnamese civilian losses may have been over half a million—a clear reflection of the all-encompassing and uncompromising nature of the decades-long conflict. The ultimate North Vietnamese victory generated nearly 800,000 refugees between 1975 and 1995.

The unconventional nature of the war and the unforgiving environment of Southeast Asia inflicted special hardships on the Vietnam-era POWs, whether they spent captivity in the jungles of the South, or the jails of the North. This book describes their experiences - the similarities and the differences - and how the POWs coped with untreated wounds and other malaises, systematic torture, and boredom. The creative strategies they devised to stay fit, track time, resist the enemy, communicate with one another, and adhere to a chain of command attest to the high standards of conduct in captivity that so distinguish the POWs of the Vietnam War.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran

 

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Chairman Bost Presses VA on Budget Shortfall, Impact on Veterans​ Today, House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Chairman Mike Bost (R-Ill.), released the following letter and statement in response to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) informing Congress that it may be facing a budget shortfall approaching $15 billion across the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2024 and FY 2025. This represents by far the largest budget shortfall that VA has experienced under any administration and a repudiation of the FY 2025 budget request that the Biden-Harris administration presented just four months ago. “Year after year, Congress, by way of the American taxpayers, makes record-breaking investments in VA to ensure veterans can get the care and benefits they are eligible for,” said Chairman Bost. “But a $15 billion dollar shortfall is no accident. It is the result of horrendous, top-to-bottom mismanagement. I question how VA could have failed to budget for increased healthcare and benefits costs resulting from the PACT Act that we all knew were coming, and I have major doubts about some of the Department’s excuses. The VA budget is serious business that has a real impact on veterans’ lives. The Biden-Harris administration has embarrassed themselves with how poorly they have mismanaged and run VA’s budget into the ground. I expect a full accounting of this mess from the Secretary and his plan to get VA’s bookkeeping in order. Veterans and taxpayers deserve better, and my committee will do our job and not rest until we get to the bottom of how these shortfalls occurred and who is responsible.” Dear Mr. Secretary: On Monday, chief financial officers from the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and Veterans Health Administration (VHA) informed the Committee that they anticipate a $2.88 billion shortfall in the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2024 related to compensation and pension and readjustment benefit payments and a $11.97 billion shortfall in FY 2025 primarily related to increased hiring and pharmaceutical costs. This represents by far the largest budget shortfall the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has experienced under any administration and a repudiation of the FY 2025 budget request that the Biden-Harris administration presented just four months ago. Not only have your chief financial officers thrown out the dollar amounts requested for many key accounts, they have abandoned many of the estimates and projections that underpinned their budget. This is not just fiscal mismanagement; it is strategic whiplash. I understand that priorities may change, but it boggles my mind how the roughly 10,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) workforce reduction and the nationwide VHA hiring restrictions that you defended just a few months ago have already become a more than 22,000 FTE increase. Hiring quality health care workers is difficult enough without a constantly moving target. I would like to reiterate the concerns that I expressed to you during the Committee’s April 11, 2024, budget hearing. I voiced my alarm that VA was barely keeping the lights on despite Congress consistently providing every dollar requested in the budget. VA’s budget has become increasingly complicated and reliant on gimmicks, apparently to compensate for the expiration of one-time, pandemic-related supplemental funding. This has created a situation where one bad estimate or unanticipated event can create a shortfall in multiple accounts. In particular, the Biden-Harris administration has repeatedly shifted regular expenses out of the base budget and dumped them into the Cost of War Toxic Exposures Fund, rather than using the Fund to pay for the incremental cost of delivering health care and benefits under the Honoring Our PACT Act of 2022, Public Law 117-168. Such budgetary mismanagement does not serve veterans’ interests or make responsible use of the resources that Congress continues to provide. The budget shortfall seems to be a troubling mix of anticipated costs that were not budgeted for and other costs that lack sufficient explanation or are speculative. For example, although compensation and pension obligations have been running below expectation so far this fiscal year, it is well understood that claims submissions have increased due to the PACT Act and this year’s rulemakings, that disability examinations increase with the volume of claim submissions and contentions, and VBA typically experiences a surge in obligations near the end of the fiscal year. That said, it is unclear why VA did not account for these potential expenses in its original or revised budget requests. Similarly, the annual increase in community care obligations has been fairly constant in percentage terms since fiscal year 2022, but the Biden-Harris administration has declined to include community care growth in its base budget request for VA while seemingly straining, if not breaking, the limits of what the Toxic Exposures Fund can pay for. In contrast, explanations for the need for a $3.87 billion increase in pharmaceutical and prosthetics spending across FY 2024 and FY 2025 were spotty at best, including a round $1 billion to manage unspecified “chronic disease,” speculation that demand for Ozempic and similar drugs may be the cause, and no explanation at all for the increased prosthetic expense. Additionally, I am troubled by the VHA chief financial officer’s repeat suggestions that the Change Healthcare ransomware attack may be to blame for any or all of VA’s faulty budgetary projections. Aside from shifting $700 million of medical collections from FY 2024 to FY 2025, the Change Healthcare incident seems to have been used as a convenient excuse. Above all, the budget shortfall seems to be driven by the 22,304 FTE increase from the FY 2024 budget to VHA’s new projection for FY 2025. My understanding is roughly 17,000 FTE have already been hired and about 5,000 FTE remain to be hired. Given Under Secretary for Health Elnahal’s announced policy of nationwide hiring restrictions and managing by attrition, I think veterans and employees deserve a much better explanation of where these 22,304 FTE are being hired. I also think taxpayers deserve a thorough explanation of the 180-degree reversal from Dr. Elnahal’s statement in February 2024 that, “we have the nationwide staffing level we need to accomplish this important mission — and we have the funding we need to care for veterans through 2024 and into 2025…As responsible stewards of these funds, we must make thoughtful decisions about resource use at every level of the enterprise…” I am also concerned that some of the FTE increase represents VHA’s continued, ill-fated campaign to reduce community care utilization, ignoring the myriad personal or medical reasons why individual veterans choose to get their care in the community as is their right under the VA MISSION Act of 2018, P.L. 115-182, access standards. Given the chief financial officers’ expressed urgency, I respectfully ask that you answer the following questions no later than July 26, 2024, to help the Committee fully understand VA’s expected budget shortfall. Please note, the Committee will resort to compulsory processes, if necessary, to obtain the requested information. 1) Was former Chief Financial Officer Jon Rychalski’s June 17, 2024, attestation under section 7103 of the Johnny Isakson and David P. Roe, M.D. Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2020, P.L. 116-315, complete and accurate? Specifically, why did his attestation that he “collaborated with the Department subordinate chief financial officers regarding the fiscal year 2025 request” omit the substance of the required attestation “to be confident in the financial projections included in the budget request and supporting materials”? 2) Given the 22,304 FTE increase, from the FY 2024 budget to VHA’s new projection for FY 2025, do you acknowledge Dr. Elnahal misled veterans when he stated, “we have the nationwide staffing level we need to accomplish this important mission…”? Or, have there been significant, unexpected changes in demand for in-house VA care since February 2024? If so, please detail such demand changes. 3) Please provide a list of the 10 VHA healthcare systems with the largest actual or expected FTE increases throughout FY 2024 and 2025. Please also provide each such healthcare system’s community care obligations or expenditures for FY 2023, 2024, and 2025 to date along with a comparison against relevant national averages. 4) Please provide Committee staff with a briefing specifically focused on VHA’s expected $3.87 billion increase in pharmaceutical and prosthetics spending across FY 2024 and 2025. 5) Please provide Committee staff with another briefing specifically focused on the impact of the Change Healthcare ransomware attack’s impacts on VA’s budgetary projections or estimates, anticipated obligations or expenditures, the timing or amount of medical collections, or any other matter relevant to the budget shortfall. 6) Please explain the effects of VA’s continued inability to use the Program Integrity Tool on medical collections, the accuracy of community care payments including improper payments, and the resulting budgetary impact. This issue was not mentioned during the budget shortfall presentation. The Office of Inspector General estimates the impact on revenue operations to exceed $665 million. 7) Please explain the basis of the estimate, made in the FY 2024 budget request, that the number of individuals receiving educational entitlement would be significantly less in 2024 than in 2023. Given the projected shortfall in the readjustment account, this estimate appears to have been erroneous. 8) Please reconcile the primary justification for the VBA shortfall, unexpected or greater than expected increases in claims workload, with the projection in the FY 2025 budget request that claims receipts, including PACT Act claims, would increase by 85% and non-rating claim receipts would increase by 60% by FY 2025. 9) Please explain whether VA’s FY 2025 budget request correctly accounted for the impact of the increase in claims submissions on the volume or expected cost of disability compensation examinations, either in VBA discretionary or mandatory accounts. How much of VBA’s projected shortfall, if any, is attributable to modifications to the disability compensation examination contracts? US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting Viet-Nam Combat Veteran ​

 

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VA Faces Budget Shortfall​

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has announced a significant budget shortfall, with projected deficits of $12 billion in 2025 and a $3 billion shortfall in 2024. The main drivers of this shortfall include:

• Increased costs for veterans’ benefits, particularly due to the implementation of the PACT Act, which expanded care and benefits to millions of veterans exposed to toxins during their military service.
• Higher costs for prescription drugs and a growing workforce.
• Increased utilization of community care, which allows veterans to see doctors outside the VA using VA funding.

VA Secretary Denis McDonough has attributed the shortfall to the department’s success in implementing the PACT Act, which has led to more veterans seeking benefits and care. He has emphasized the need for Congress to act by mid-September to prevent a delay in benefit payments to veterans.
Lawmakers have responded with concern, accusing the VA of fiscal mismanagement and demanding more information on the shortfall. A bipartisan group of senators has introduced a bill to fix the nearly $3 billion shortfall for disability and education benefits, while House Veterans Affairs Committee Chairman Mike Bost has threatened to subpoena VA officials if they do not provide more information.
The VA is exploring ways to address the shortfall, including the use of artificial intelligence tools to reduce workforce burdens and anticipate veterans’ needs. However, the exact measures the department will take to cover the shortfall remain unclear.


US ARMY SPC 5 whitefish Reporting
Viet-Nam Combat Veteran